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There is something for everyone to dislike about early twenty-first century 
copyright.  Owners of content say that newer and better technologies have made it 
too easy to pirate.  Easy copying, they say, threatens the basic incentive to create 
new works; new rights and remedies are needed to restore the balance.  Academic 
critics instead complain that a growing copyright give content owners dangerous
levels of control over expressive works.  In one version of this argument, this 
growth threatens the creativity and progress that copyright is supposed to foster; in 
another, it represents an “enclosure movement” that threatens basic freedoms of 
expression.1  Copyright, these critics argue, has wandered beyond its proper 
boundaries.  They contend that the balance must be restored.
What all these arguments have in common is a focus on copyright’s 
“authorship” function.  Copyright policy, in this view, is fundamentally about 
providing a balance of incentives for authors to effectuate one of several possible 
goals, such as progress of science,2 democratic governance,3 or the system of free 
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1 An examplar of the latter view is Yohai Benkler, Free As The Air To Common Use: First 
Amendment Constraints On Enclosure of The Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) (arguing 
that legal rules “enclosing” information risk the diversity of information sources and threatens 
freedom of speech); the former view, LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001) (endorsing 
an “information commons” from which authors may draw for creative inputs).
2 This is a goal expressed in the copyright clause itself.  See U.S. Const. Art. I, §  8, cl. 8.
3 See generally Neil Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996) 
(arguing that copyright has two democracy-enhancing functions in that (1) it incentivizes 
production and (2) it supports a sector of creative activity free from government subsidy, 
patronage, etc.).
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expression.4   Few disagree that these are the goals: the main disagreement is over 
what means serve these ends.
Yet the recent history of copyright begs the question of whether this debate 
captures what is right and wrong with the law.   Both sides point to the same 
problem: a tragedy of authorship caused by their opponents.   Critics of copyright 
say that aggressive over-enforcement of copyright deters those who would borrow 
from others to create, such as music samplers, satirists, and film-makers.  
Copyright’s backers warn, conversely, that piracy threatens the very livelihood of 
the artist and creative industries.  The story of twin tragedies, however, creates an
indeterminate debate.  Both positions have difficulty demonstrating empirically, as 
opposed to anecdotally, that either overprotection or piracy has stilled the engines 
of creativity.   At a theoretical level, any putative change in copyright protection 
can both be defended as a necessary creative incentive and attacked as an 
unnecessary control. 
This article suggests that the main challenge for 21st century copyright are not 
challeges of authorship policy, but rather new and harder problems for copyright’s 
communications policy: copyright’s poorly understood role in the regulating 
competition among rival disseminators.5  Since its inception copyright has set 
important baselines upon which publishers and their modern equivalents do 
business. As the pace of technological change accelerates, copyright’s role in 
setting the conditions for competition is quickly becoming more important, even
challenging for primacy the significance of copyright’s encouragement of 
authorship.
None of this is to say that the debate over authorship is a sham, or that 
copyright’s role in incentivizing authorship is unimportant.   The law, I suggest,
can be usefully understood in a modular fashion: as comprised of both authorship 
and communication regimes whose functions are often independent.   The first 
regime is the familiar system, run by the courts, that grants exclusive rights to 
encourage creativity.6  The second is a messier regulatory regime comprised mainly 
4 This is a value given priority in Benkler, supra, note 1. 
5 For a discussion of this definition of “communications policy,” see infra note 41. 
6 See infra note 23.
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of the sections of copyright that have always perplexed copyright theorists and 
have never fit the central theme of author-incentives. This de facto communications 
regime runs through the legislative process and the courts, that takes largely the 
form industry-specific liability rules, court-created immunities and special 
accommodations.7
The study of copyright’s communications policy has both a descriptive and a 
normative payoff.   First, it helps us understand both the existing copyright code 
and the history of 20th century copyright.   Much of the existing copyright code is 
difficult to describe as a device for providing incentives to create new works.8  That 
description may fit various “core” doctrines that consume the bulk of scholarly 
attention, such as the idea/expression dichotomy,9 term limits,10 and parts of the 
fair use doctrine.11   But the copyright code is also full of complex compulsory 
licensing schemes and technologically-specific immunities.12 The link to authorship 
in such sections is unclear at best.   I suggest it will be useful to understand these 
apparent anomalies part of copyright’s regulation of competing disseminators.
The observation is confirmed by the 20th century of Copyright, where the law 
has played a recurring role in competition between incumbent and challenger 
disseminators. What follows characterizes the copyright’s communications policy 
into two modes (“classic,” and “new”) corresponding to two time periods.   In the 
first, from 1900-1976, the copyright’s classic communications regime evolved 
through a series of long and extensive conflicts between competitive rivals: such as 
cable and broadcast, radio and song-writers, and the early recording players and 
sheet music publishers.13 This era is characterized by judicial reluctance, even in 
the face of precedent, to extend to incumbents rights of copyright that might be 
used for market advantage over a technologically-advanced rival.  The statutory
7 See Section I.C., infra.
8 This fact is not unnoticed among economic scholars.  See infra, discussion at text 
accompanying note 38.
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
10 See Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, § 102(b) and (d), 112 Stat. 2827-2828 
(amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304).
11 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
12 These sections are described in depth in Section I.C, infra.
13 These three conflicts are described in Section I.D, infra.
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result were the series of government-mandated access schemes, known as 
“compulsory licenses,” that make up the bulk of the copyright code and are 
otherwise difficult to characterize.
In the second period, from the 1976 Act onward has witnessed the emergence of 
a new form of communications policy:  judicial creation of copyright immunities
meant to benefit competitive innovation.14 The foundation is the rule announced in 
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc,15 which grants some immunity from
copyright liability for technological inventions of general utility. 16   It can be 
understood as a device for the judiciary to try and balance the concerns of 
authorship against those of competition and communications policy.17 Coupled 
with other immunities, such as those created for Internet Service Providers in 
199718 and the rule on reverse engineering,19 the result is a copyright law that has 
taken new measures to deal with use of copyright as a tool of competitive 
advantage.
The study of copyright’s role in regulating competition, I suggest, reveals a 
copyright that theorists hardly know.  It is not that scholars are unaware of 
copyright’s role in communications policy—the importance of “dissemination” has 
always been recognized as a goal of copyright.20   The point, rather, is that the 
author-centrism of copyright theory has left little basis to evaluate or criticize 
copyright’s decisions that create communications policy.   
There is, finally, a normative payoff from the study of copyright’s role in 
communications regulation. In the last several decades, the United States has 
14 See Section III.B-D, infra.
15464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
16 More precisely, Sony holds that “the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other 
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely 
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.” Id. at 442.
17 Cf. Randal Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 423, 424 (2002) (describing Sony as a rule of market entry).
18 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (immunity scheme for internet service providers).
19 See Section III.C(1), infra. 
20 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (Copyright’s 
“private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of 
literature, music, and the other arts.”).
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generally endorsed a model of open, competitive innovation as its national 
communications policy.21   It is, in other words, generally agreed that neither 
government nor industry monopolists are well situated to choose what 
technologies or firms the nation should use to communicate, now or in the future. 22
Copyright, as it grows in importance, should not be exempt from such principles.
Few would disgree that the basic vision of competitive innovation is an attractive 
vision.   While many may disagree on how the goal might best be achieved, it 
cannot be reached without an awareness of the role that copyright plays in setting 
national communications policy.  That requires that judges and policymakers 
further develop an appreciation of copyright’s effects on parties other than authors.
The Article is divided into three parts.   The first describes American 
Copyright’s “classic” communications policy.  After situating the communications 
perspective in traditional copyright theory, it explains where the legal expression 
of copyright’s communications regime can be found, and details its evolution
during the period 1900-1976.   The second part is primarily theoretical.  It provides
tools, taken from telecommunications and competition theory, for understanding 
and analyzing the communications policies that copyright has implemented.  The 
third part describes copyright’s “new” communications policy, which has evolved
post-1976.  It closes on a normative note, suggesting how courts and lawmakers 
can decide copyright issues with an eye to their effects for competition and national 
communications policy.
21 See Section II.B, infra.
22 See id.
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PART I: A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF COPYRIGHT
A. Author-Centrism
Copyright theory is traditionally depicted as a long conflict between two 
dueling theories, a jurisprudential approximation of the 100-year War.  In accounts 
now very familiar to copyright theorists, the first of these warring theories is 
Anglo-American and describes the purposes of copyright as “utilitarian” or 
“economic.”23  It premises the existence of copyright on market failure.24
Copyright exists to provide incentives for authors to produce works and thereby 
avoid underproduction that might otherwise result.25  Under this theory copyright 
law is ultimately similar to other forms of economic legislation, for it is Lord 
Macaulay’s “tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers.”26
The rival to the Anglo-American view resides mainly on the continent and is 
known in the United States as the natural-rights theory of copyright.   It suggests 
that authors have a moral right to the fruits of their labors:  Copyright is granted 
because the author deserves it.27  One version of this idea says that authors should 
be rewarded for the value they contribute to society.28  Another, older version 
posits a natural link between creation and ownership: the author owns his 
23 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (“Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is the 
central problem in copyright law.  For copyright law to promote economic efficiency, its 
principal legal doctrines must, at least approximately, maximize the benefits from creating 
additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and the costs of administering 
copyright protection.”).
24 See id. at 327.
25 See id. at 328.
26 T. Macaulay, SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT 25 (C. Gaston ed. 1914).
27 See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO 
STATE L.J. 517, 522-24 nn. 27-44 (1990) (detailing the evolution of natural rights theory through 
Roman and English Law).  For an example of a contemporary natural rights theory, see Wendy 
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (arguing that a return to natural rights theory 
would protect free speech interests).
28 See Marshall Leaffer, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 58 (3d ed. 1999).
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(smaller) creation in just the manner that God owns his (slightly larger) Creation.  
What you create is yours: “to every cow its calf.”29
Today this traditional debate has taken on a modern gloss.   Natural rights 
theories, in the United States at least, have retreated to the status of foil, used more 
to accuse than to defend. 30 The dominant starting point for most American 
scholarship is an incentives theory, or the “incentive/access” paradigm, the idea 
that the copyright expresses some balance between encouraging creation of 
expressive works, while providing for adequate access to the work for new authors 
and others.   As Mark Lemley expresses the conventional wisdom, “both the 
United States Constitution and judicial decisions seem to acknowledge the primacy 
of incentive theory in justifying intellectual property.”31  Starting from this premise, 
theorists move in different directions.  More sophisticated economic theories stress 
the utility of assigning intellectual property rights to owners, arguing that owned 
assets will gravitate towards their most valuable use.32   Meanwhile, a cluster of 
new copyright theories seek reasons other than market failure to explain why 
29 Augustine Birrell, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 42 
(1899).
30 Much recent writing on natural rights theories of copyright seeks not to defend it, but 
rather to accuse Congress or the courts of wrongly reinstituting a natural rights regime through 
expansion of copyright.  See, e.g., James Boyle, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 56-59 (1996); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND 
OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 125-28 (1993); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: 
The Metamorphoses of "Authorship", 1991 DUKE L. J. 455;  Gordon, supra note 27, at 1540 (arguing 
that courts have mistakenly interpreted the natural law theory of copyright and afforded too 
much protection to authors at the expense of free speech interests).  See also Alfred C. Yen, 
Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 529-39 (1990) 
(stressing that natural law concepts are inherent in copyright law).
31 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics Of Improvement In Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 989, 993 (1997).
32 See,  e.g.,  Wendy  J.  Gordon,  An  Inquiry  into  the  Merits  of  Copyright:  The  Challenges  of 
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1435-49 (1989) (arguing 
that “author's entitlements as the starting point from which markets evolve”); Robert P. Merges, 
Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA 
Q.J. 305, 306 (1993) (economics analysis of copyright has “progressed beyond the point where a 
crude 'incentive' story passes for analysis in every case.”); Richard Posner & William Landes, 
THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Ch. 5 (2004) (describing various economic 
roles played by copyrights, mainly related to the reduction of transaction costs).
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encouraging authorship might be important.   Enjoying great academic, if not 
judicial, popularity are theories that conceive of copyright’s incentive system as 
part of the larger system of free expression associated with the First Amendment.33
Another group treats copyright’s incentive structure as playing a role in promoting 
a republican system of governance.34
This debate is familiar and greatly interesting to copyright theorists, but can 
also be misleading.  The problem with the dominant theories of copyright is that 
they increasingly fail to describe important parts of existing law and their effects. 
The reason is that the dominant access/incentives paradigm and its spin-off 
theories are not comprehensive theories of copyright.  Rather, they are mainly 
theories of authorship or of creation.  They lead, in turn, to author-centric theories of 
copyright.   And while theories of authorship are a crucial part of copyright theory, 
they provide only a partial description of the law.
This basic contention is supported by a casual read of the copyright code.  
Large portions of the statute are difficult to describe as parts of a property scheme 
balanced to encourage the creation of new works.   That description may fit certain 
core sections such as the idea/expression dichotomy in § 102 of Title 17, the 
exclusive rights expressed in § 106 and general exceptions such as the fair use 
doctrine, found in §107.  But large parts—indeed the greatest volume of actual 
text—fails to conform to this model.   These parts are rather devoted to industry-
specific liability rules (compulsory licensing schemes) and immunities—sections 
33 See, e.g., Yohai Benkler, Free As The Air To Common Use: First Amendment Constraints On 
Enclosure of The Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of 
Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L. J. 1 (2002) (evaluationg copyright on a 
theory of a free speech centered on the “freedom to imagine”); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright As A 
Model For Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has In Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign 
Finance Reform, And Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2001).   Despite the 
academic attention, arguments calling for greater scrutiny of copyright under the First 
Amendment have been nearly without exception rejected by courts, most recently in Eldred v. 
Reno, 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003) and earlier in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).   
34 See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing The Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV.L.REV. 1659 
(1988); Netanel, supra note 3. 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art5Copyright’s Communications Policy
9
that are ugly, complicated, and obscure to copyright students.35  They include the 
mechanical license in § 115, the secondary transmission license (for cable television) 
in § 111, and particular immunities for particular groups, such as internet service 
providers in § 512 and digital audio recording devices in § 1001 et seq.   Their 
relationship to a putative author’s incentives to create would seem at best indirect: 
the schemes, on their face, seem to have much more to do with managing 
competition between industry rivals.
Author-centric theories also have trouble explaining the “secondary” costs of 
copyright:  those imposed on actors other than authors and consumers. Incentive 
theories are interested in two categories of copyright’s effects:  the benefits that 
accrue to authors and the corresponding costs imposed on consumers and new 
creators.  Yet it is evident that much of the costs of copyright are borne by other 
actors.  One need only look to those who object to copyright to see where costs are 
felt.  Piracy is invariably a complaint of incumbent industries, while challengers for 
their part complain about being squashed by incumbents.36  Finally, 
telecommunications firms and electronics manufacturers complain about the costs 
they bear when enlisted to enforce copyright schemes of contributory liability.37
These secondary costs of copyright, together with the large sections of the code 
described above are datapoints that today’s theories fail to explain.
It is important to stress that scholars are not altogether unaware of the limits of 
authorship theories.  Economic theorists, in particular, are in the midst of an 
ongoing effort to generate economic explanations for aspects of copyright that do 
not fit the central incentives story.  Transactions costs, evidentiary concerns, and 
35 These sections enjoy only passing attention in copyright casebooks, see, e.g., Nimmer et 
al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPRIGHT 225-227, 556 (6th ed. 2000) (4 pages on compulsory 
licensing in a book of 1230 pages) although the difficulty and tedium of teaching statutory 
licenses explains this cursory treatment.
36 See, e.g., Lee Gomes, “In Name of Innovation Some Let Technology Get Away With 
Murder,“WALL ST. J., May  5, 2003 at B1 (discussing whether technological innovation provides 
an excuse for piracy); Jack Kapica, “Copyright litigation is threatening innovation,” THE GLOBE
AND MAIL, December 11, 2003 at B13 (suggesting that copyright threatens innovation). 
37 See, e.g., Mike Musgrove, “Copyfight Renewal: Owners of Digital Devices Sue to Assert 
the Right to Record,” WASH. POST April 7, 2002, at E01 (detailing fight between electronics firms 
and Hollywood). 
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rent dissipation play a major role in such efforts. 38 What follows is for the most 
part complementary, rather than a rival to these efforts to undercover secondary 
purposes of of the copyright law.39
The descriptive theory that follows unifies authorship and communications 
policies is an effort to give a more complete account of what copyright is doing, 
and why.   Even authorship and communication policy cannot, of course, explain 
all of copyright, and many sections of the law reflect multiple considerations.  
However, if what follows is correct, copyright is playing a role in communications 
policy only partially described by today’s theories and one likely to be of 
increasing importance as the scope of copyright increases.
B. A Descriptive Theory of Copyright Law
It is not wrong or inaccurate to say that copyright is system of property rights
designed to encourage creation.  However, copyright can also be usefully described 
as a system that has evolved to manage competition among natural rivals in the 
world of packaged information.  To see what this means, consider the world of 
packaged information as comprised primarily of three groups:  authors, 
disseminators, and consumers of expressive works.
38 Principal examples include RICHARD POSNER & WILLIAM LANDES, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003); Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of 
Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 (2003) (describing sections of copyright as motivated by an 
evidentiary function); Picker, supra note 17; Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy  
(2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID374580_code030130570.pdf?abstractid=37
4580 (describing much of copyright as motivated by an interest in preventing redundancy and 
rent dissipation).
39 This is particular true with respect to Randy Picker’s recent work, which is interested in 
copyright from the perspective of antitrust policy and a foundation for much of what follows 
here.  See Picker, supra note 17; Randal Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of 
Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U.CHI. L. REV. 28 (2003).  
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art5Copyright’s Communications Policy
11
Fig 1.1: Copyright Relationships
These parties—authors, old and new disseminators, and consumers, are in repeat 
relationships fraught with potential for conflict and abusive behavior.  While 
conflicts may arise between any of the pictured parties, 40 the law focuses on two 
repeated relationships: those between new and existing authors and those between 
incumbent and challenger disseminators.   The first is familiar; it is copyright’s 
authorship regime.   The second is less so; it is copyright’s communications regime—
so named because it regulates the same parties (disseminators) as communications 
law, and because it confronts similar problems.41
40 The contest between freelance writers and those who distribute their materials online is 
an example of the relationship between existing authors and new disseminators.  See, e.g., New 
York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (concerning a clash over the newspaper’s sale of 
copyrighted text to be retrievable in a database search).  So, to a degree, was the conflict 
between composers and music publishers and the radio broadcast industry, see infra notes 107-
158.
41 As used in this paper, the term “communications policy” refers to the particular 
questions of competition policy that emerge in the industries of telecommunications.  
Communications policy is therefore an application of antitrust principles in a repeat context.  
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Fig. 1.2 Problematic Behavior in the World of Copyright
What kinds of problems emerge amongst new and existing players?  Copyright 
law has evolved to deal with two recurrent types of abusive behavior.  The first is 
misappropriation, which arises because each “new” actor (whether author or 
disseminator) has the capability to appropriate and free-ride off of the investments 
made by existing actors, whether in expressive works, distribution channels, or 
otherwise.42   The mirror image of misappropriation is lockout behavior, which 
arises from the capability of an existing actor to block market entry and exclude or 
control potential new competitors.   The various legal schemes engineered to 
prevent these two private wrongs can be understood to comprise much of what we 
call the copyright law.
for the consolidation of reasoning in communications law and antitrust). The context is 
distinguished by two factors: first, the frequent existence of bottleneck infrastructures, see infra
II.A,  and second, the existence of fixed statutory policies that occasionally mandate deviations 
from the goal of maximizing consumer welfare, such as the goals of “universal service” 
(communications technologies should be available to every citizen), see generally Milton 
Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone History: A Reconstruction, 17 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y
352, 356 (1993),  and “localism” (support for local media outlets over national), see, e.g., 47 
U.S.C.A. § 521(2) (discussing importance of local control over cable).    
42 Wendy Gordon describes this as the “restitutionary impulse.”   See Wendy Gordon, On 
Owning Information, Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV.  149 (1992); 
see also Richard Posner, Misappropriation:  A Dirge, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 621 (2003) 
(Misappropriation “is a candidate to be the overarching principle that would rationalize 












It is important to stress that nothing here assumes that the actors pictured will 
always behave in abusive ways.   Not every new writer is a plagiarist nor is every 
incumbent industry bent on destroying emergent competitors.   But in this view 
copyright has, as Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested generally, evolved to meet 
systematic misbehavior.43
Given this introduction of the problems copyright faces, we can now turn to the 
substance of the regimes that have arisen to counter them.  Copyright’s authorship 
regime needs little introduction because it is already the focus of most scholarly 
attention.   It is only worth noting that copyright handles the misappropriation 
problem among authors in very clever ways.  Copyright for authors has created a 
doctrinal “floor” and “ceiling,” where the floor is the requirement of originality, 
and the ceiling is the lack of protection for the ideas underlying expression.44
Together, and joined by the fair use exception,45 these core doctrines create the 
familiar idea of a balance that allows certain but not all forms of appropriation.  
This is a familiar subject to anyone who has studied copyright and needs little 
repetition.  Conversely, copyright’s communications regime, which manages 
similar problems among disseminators, is far less studied and understood.   The 
remainder of this Part is an effort to remedy that imbalance.
C. The Communications Regime Revealed
Copyright’s communications regime, its management of rival disseminators, is 
not a recent phenomenon, for it actually predates copyright’s authorship regime.  
The management of competition among publishers, copyright historians tell us, 
was actually the earliest purpose of copyright.  Historian Ray Patterson explains:
[H]istory shows us [that] copyright began as a publisher’s right, a right which 
functioned in the interest of the publisher, with no concern for the author.  
43 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).  This was 
also a view of law stated by Epicurus: “the laws exist for the sake of the wise, not that they may 
not do wrong, but that they may not suffer it.”  Epicurus, The Complete Extant Writings of 
Epicurus, in THE STOIC AND EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHERS 51 (Trans. Cyril Bailey 1940).  
44 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
45 See Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. 253 (1983)
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Indeed, it existed as such for over a hundred and fifty years before it was … 
deemed to function primarily in the interest of the author.”46
According to copyright historians the stationer’s (publishers) rights of the 1500s 
and 1600s, later codified in the Statute of Anne,47 allocated among the stationers the 
exclusive rights to copy a given manuscript (the copy-rights).48   The original 
copyrights functioned as a device that eliminated direct competition between 
stationers and were generally unconcerned with authorial matters.49  As Joseph 
Lowenstein explains, the earliest ancestors of copyright were “a privilege conferred 
by the guild on one of its members, part of an imperfect but not ineffective system 
by which the guild sought to preserve internal order.”50
Matters have changed less in the last 400 years than one might think. 
Copyright, as in the 17th century, is still quite concerned with maintaining order 
among the rival stationers of our era. What follows through the end of Part I is an 
effort to describe the “classic” communications regime, centered on legislative 
settlements placed in the copyright code.   After discussing communications policy 
in Part II, Part III describes copyright’s “new” communications regime, which has 
evolved mainly after 1976 and is centered on specific immunities to copyright 
liability.
1. Statutory Modules
46 LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 8-9 (1968).    Some, such 
as Jane Ginsburg, would argue that the word copyright should not be understood other than as 
a right subsisting in an author,  and that to speak of a publisher’s or stationer’s copyright is a 
contradiction in terms.  I take no position on this issue, but note that some historians do use the 
term copyright in reference to the early rights of publishers.  See id.; see also Benjamin Kaplan, 
AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 5 (1967) (using the term in this manner). 
47 Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
48 For a discussion of the early history involving the Stationers’ Copyright and the Statute 
of Anne, see L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ View of the 
Copyright Power Granted to Congress In Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 
EMORY L.J. 909, 913-28 (2003).
49 See Kaplan, supra note 46, at 5 (“They [stationer’s copyrights] did not, however, stand on 
any notion of original composition, for they might be granted for ancient as well as new 
works.”).




The most obvious and important manifestation of copyright’s communication 
regime take up the most of Title 17 of the United States Code: the complex 
statutory management schemes that balance the respective rights of dissemination 
industries.   The rules embedded in Title 17 are modules of communications policy 
specific to a particular industry and, usually, to a specific historical context. Each 
is complicated and lengthy, and make for perhaps the least glamorous parts of 
copyright.   Yet it is the ambition of this section to reveal the sections for what they 
are:  the embodiments of copyright’s classic communications policy.
Most of the modules are occupy §111 to §122 of Title 17 of the United States 
code.   Each has much in common:  each speaks to and manages competition 
between potential communications rivals:  broadcast/cable; broadcast/satellite; 
phonograph/Internet, and so on.   The most common way of achieving a 
compromise between rivals is a “compulsory licensing” scheme: laws that force the 
copyright owner to provide open and non-discriminatory access to a work in 
exchange for a fixed payment.   Modern modules, such as the §512 scheme for 
internet service providers, create immunities schemes.
A summary description of the major modules and their features follows:
a.  Secondary transmissions by cable operators and others.
This is an extremely complex compulsory license scheme enacted in 1976.   It 
was enacted in response to cable operators’ unpaid usage of broadcast signals 
in the 1950s-70s.   It requires rebroadcasters—principally, cable operators, but 
also hotels and apartment complexes—to pay a fixed fee for a license to 
rebroadcast copyrighted materials and is found in 17 U.S.C. § 111.
b.  Digital Audio Transmission / Webcasting license
A provision requiring Internet “radio-stations” to pay a statutory fee in order to 
rebroadcast copyrighted materials is found in § 114.
c.  The “Mechanical License”
This compulsory license allows anyone wanting to record a composed song to 
pay a fixed fee to the composer.  It also allows recording of “cover” versions of 
famous songs.  The mechanical license is found in § 115.
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d.  Jukebox negotiated licenses
This section mandates negotiation for the licenses to play sound recordings of 
nondramatic musical works on jukeboxes and is located in § 116.
e.  Public Broadcast License
§ 118 of the Copyright Act creates a compulsory license for the use of published 
nondramatic musical works and published pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works in connection with noncommercial broadcasting.
f.  Satellite retransmissions of television signals
A compulsory license scheme, similar to that found in § 111, applies specifically 
to satellite rebroadcast of content both from broadcasters and from cable 
operators and is found in § 119.
g.  Satellite retransmissions of television signals into local markets.
A bargain between the satellite, broadcast, and cable industries, § 122 grants 
satellite rebroadcasters a free (no-royalty) compulsory license for local 
broadcasting, provided they agree to carry all television broadcast stations 
located within the local market.51
h.  Immunity for ISPs transmitting or hosting infringing material
A compromise reached in 1998 between Internet Service Providers and content 
owners grants Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) varying levels of immunity 
for the storage or transmission of copyrighted content.   ISPs are generally 
immune transmission of infringing content, while search engines and those 
who host content and are subject to a duty to take or delink infringing material 
upon notice.  These rules are found in § 512 of Title 17.
i.  Immunity for producers of digital audio recording devices
§ 1008 contains a grant of immunity to manufacturers of digital audio recording 
devices (like “DATs”) on condition of the payment of a royalty on each sale.
51 See Ellen P. Goodman, Bargains In The Information Marketplace: The Use Of Government 
Subsidies To Regulate New Media, 1 J. TELECOM & HIGH TECH. 217 (2003).
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The existence and significance of the statutory modules cannot be questioned.  
The cable industry, just to take one example, based its early existence on access to 
copyrighted works, and has paid billions in access fees to broadcasters.52   Yet 
where do these modules come from and what purpose do they servce?
Unlike the familiar judicial process behind most of copyright’s authorship 
decision, the process behind copyright’s communications regime is a much 
murkier subject.  The complex statutory modules described above are the product 
of a different and somewhat unusual institutional process:  a mixed procedure of 
the federal courts (particularly the Supreme Court), and a separate process of 
mediated copyright settlement.  The usual but not invariable results are the modules 
that are the active mainstay of copyright’s communications regime. 
Scholars are aware of and have documented the history of negotiated 
settlement in the context of copyright and new technologies.53  But what follows is 
an effort to understand the process not as just as a history but as an institution.  
What immediately follows is not a claim about the ideal institutional process for 
creating communications policy, but rather a description of how such policy is 
made. 
3.   A Model of Conflict
The central modules of copyright’s classic communications policy have arisen 
out of conflict–out of bitter, public battles between incumbent and challenger 
disseminators who often seem determined to do or say anything to get their way.  
That is the repeated pattern of the 20th century copyright conflict and, if the first 
few years are any indication, will persist as a part of the 21st century copyright 
landscape.
52 The cable industry had paid about $2.5 billion as of 1997 for access to broadcast signals.  
See COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING REGIMES COVERING 
RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS 43 (1997) (citing testimony of the National Cable 
Television Association).
53 See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY (2003); Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and 
Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1613 (2001); Jessica 
Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OREGON LAW REVIEW 275 (1989); 
Trotter Hardy, Copyright and “New Use” Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 659 (1999).
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The 20th century witnessed decades-long battles between, to name just a few 
examples, the recording industry and sheet music publishers,54 cable and 
broadcast, 55 electronics manufacturers and recording companies,56 and online 
music distributors.57   But why do these conflicts arise?   To what degree are they a 
permanent part of copyright’s environment? 
This Section argues that given only very basic assumptions, public conflicts—
efforts to enlist government aid—among rival disseminators are nearly inevitable 
and therefore that they are a permanent problem for copyright’s regulation of 
packaged information.   What follows is closely related to the model of 
misappropriation and lockout discussed above, and to the “bottleneck-foreclosure” 
problem discussed in Part II. 58  It is a model based on a simple public choice 
theory.59
We can predict that conflicts between incumbent and challenger disseminators 
will arise so long as two things are true:  first, that more efficient technologies of 
dissemination will be invented and second, that there exists the possibility, but not 
the certainty, of convincing Government to provide laws that can be used against a 
competitor.   I suggest, in other words, that the conflicts that arise in the copyright 
world are not much different from those in other areas where government might 
act, if convinced, to protect market competitors.60   For example, the conflicts 
between classes of disseminators are conceptually similar to the conflicts that arise 
when domestic industries face more efficient foreign competitors.61   The difference 
is that the copyright law, rather than tariffs and other trade barriers, is invoked.
54 See infra section II.D(1).
55 See infra section II.D(3).
56 See infra section III.B.
57 See infra text accompanying notes 354 to 373.
58 See Section II.A., infra.
59 See infra notes 65 to 70.
60 Cf. James B. Speta, A Vision of Internet Openness by Government Fiat, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1553, 1573 (2002).
61 Cf. Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Conotribute to Economic Growth and 
Development?, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 285 (describing similar model).
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An incumbent, established disseminator sells expressive works using existing 
technology:  its costs, including payments to authors, result in supply curve SI.   To 
simplify, assume that the copyright law confers no ability to set a supra-
competitive price, so that that the price is set where supply meets demand, as 
follows:




A challenger is any entity who enjoys an advantage in the efficiency of 
dissemination (supply curve SC).   This condition can arise for several reasons. The 
first reason derives from any technological advantage in the delivery of content –
either better quality (like cable or piano rolls), or lower cost (like broadcasting or 
online distribution).   Either form of technological advantage can be modeled as 
simply a more efficient supply curve.  The second derives from the challenger 
being able to disseminate content less expensively because it does not pay for the 
works itself.  That may be the case either because existing copyright law does not 
explicitly apply (as was the case with early cable and gramophone technology)62 or 
because of some capability to evade copyright law’s requirement to license the 
work (as in the example of online distribution).63   In either case, part of the
challenger’s advantage in efficiency stems from what is usually described as 
piracy. 
62 In fact, in the case of gramophones, it was written explicitly not to, because Congress did 
not want operators of penny arcades to have to buy a copy of the sheet music for use of a 
novelty device.  See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 337, 352 (2002) 
(citing H.Rep. No. 2222, at 7-9 (1909)).
63 See infra notes 342 to 373 and accompanying text.
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But why does the arrival of a more efficient technological rival create conflict?  
Conflict arises because of the second assumption: that government can sometimes 
be convinced to protect the incumbent industry, but not always, and not 
predictably.   If the degree of protection is difficult to predict and depends in part 
on investments in persuasion, it makes sense for both the incumbent and the 
challenger to invest in efforts to obtain a favorable outcome.   These rival 
investments in obtaining a favorable governmental action result in some of the 
longest running conflicts in copyright history.64
 More precisely, conflict arises in a form that public choice theorists call a 
contest between “rent-protecting” and “rent-seeking” interests.   This is a contest 
where an incumbent dedicates resources to protecting its favorable position against 
encroachment by other groups.65  The incumbent holds a number of potential legal 
threats against any challenger, including the imposition of incessant litigation 
costs,66 an ability to convince regulators (like the Federal Communications 
64 Cf. James Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in Toward a Theory of the Rent-
Seeking Society 9-11 (1980) (explaining that the possibility of government action encourages 
investments in efforts to obtain rents).
65 For an explication of rent-protecting in the context of public choice theory, see Robert E. 
Tollison, Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 506, 515-517 (Dennis Mueller, ed., 
1997).
66 See Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 705 (2003).
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Commission) to restrict the challenger,67 or lobbying for laws that will put the 
challenger at a serious disadvantage.68
Part II of this paper describes in greater detail how copyright laws and other 
laws can be used as a tool of foreclosure.   Here we can set forth the incumbent’s 
potential strategies.    There are two:  the first is to try eliminate the challenge by 
increasing the challenger’s costs, by, for example, denying the challenger access to 
an essential input (the copyrighted work).   The result is pictured below, where the 
challenger’s supply curve is shifted to the uncompetitive Sc*.This is a strategy akin 
to seeking trade protection through tariff or an import ban.   The second strategy is 
to co-opt the challenger:  to allow the challenger to sell at a price corresponding to 
its more efficient supply curve, but to pay a tax to the incumbent that transfers as 
much of its producer surplus as possible.  In either case the incumbent relies on 
government assistance to achieve its desired result.






The technological challenger, meanwhile, invests its own producer surplus 
(based on its more efficient supply curve) in efforts to prevent government from 
protecting the disseminator or increasing the challengers’ costs.   Such investments 
can be as basic as defending in copyright litigation, but can also include more 
outlandish measures such as using the antitrust law or devising better means of 
evading copyright enforcement (a recent strategy).
67 See, e.g., infra note 221.
68 See Wu, supra note 66, at 705.
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For all of these strategies, the critical assumption is that the form and the 
outcome of the government’s action will be hard to predict.   Imperfect information 
is the barrier to settlement, and the unknown and unknowable is what the 
Government will do.69 If, conversely, everyone knew what Government was likely 
to do, then settlement of copyright’s communications disputes would be fast.
There are many reasons why Government action will be hard to predict when 
new technologies of dissemination are invented.  First, unlike, say, traffic accidents, 
there are relatively few inventions of major new dissemination technologies—in 
the 20th century, at best, one a decade or so.   There is therefore a thin market for 
paying off challenger industries wielding new technologies. Second, unlike a tort 
lawsuit, there are multiple government actors involved.  Courts using copyright
law  may take one side, Congress another; the antitrust  law  and Federal 
Communications Commission make occasional cameo appearances.70  As a result, 
the sum total of government action is much harder to predict than it is in the 
settlement of a run-of-the-mill lawsuit.   This inherent and historical 
unpredictability makes early settlement unlikely.   Finally, not only is the direction 
of government action difficult to predict, but so is its effectiveness.   Copyright 
enforcement can be costly and challenging.  The knowledge that government 
action may be of unpredictable effectiveness increases the uncertainty that leads to 
copyright conflicts.
Conversely, what would happen in the absence of any government rules, 
regulations, decrees or other involvement?  If the incumbents were denied any 
possibility of obtaining government protection from the technologically advanced 
challenger, its strategy would then depend on its capability for self-enforcement:  
its ability to protect its products and its producer surplus by non-legal means.   For 
example, in a world without government, broadcasters might have prevented the 
cable industry from “stealing” its signals by using physical force or, today, better 
69 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5 (4th ed. 1992) (observing that 
lack of information makes settlement of lawsuits less likely).
70  For a discussion of FCC involvement in radio see infra notes 107 to 158 and 
accompanying text.  For a discussion of the involvement in the cable-broadcast dispute, see infra 
notes 186 to 259.
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scrambling of signals.71    Today, even with a copyright law, the recording industry 
uses non-legal means to increase the costs of distributing its products using online 
distribution.72
The effectiveness of such self-enforcement is likely unpredictable, and so total 
absence of government involvement would not necessarily lead to peace and 
agreement between competing disseminators.   Again, what is most likely to lead 
to rapid settlement is predictable government action with known effects in any 
direction.
From this discussion one might expect me to advocate greater predictability in 
order to minimize investments in seeking government favor, behavior that public 
choice theory considers wasteful “rent-seeking.”73  But I have not argued here, as 
the classic rent-seeking literature would, that such expenditures are wasteful or 
undesirable.   As Part II explains, the costs of rent-seeking may be worthwhile if it 
is unclear which technology is actually better, and if the rent-seeking process 
eventually allows the better technology to win out.  Predictable government 
action—a hypothetical copyright dictator—could eliminate all conflict by choosing 
a winner but also pick the wrong winner.   So the costs of rent-seeking may be 
justified by a better substantive result. 
To summarize: the existence of unpredictable copyright protection and new
technologies should produce long contests to obtain favorable governmental 
decisions.  Because it is not obvious what government will do, incumbent 
industries, like broadcasters, the recording industry, and sheet-music publishers, 
can be expected to end up in long contests with challengers to persuade 
government to take favorable action.   The result of such contests is copyright’s de 
71 Cf. Lee Kovarsky, Technological Substitution and the Arms-Race Theory of Copyright (draft 
on file with author) (arguing that copyright owners have a choice between seeking self-
protection, copyright protection, or both).
72 See Wu, supra note 66, at 739-741 (describing non-legal methods used by recording 
industry against online music distribution).
73 See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT 
SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 4 (James M. Buchanan et al., eds., 1980) (“The term rent seeking is designed to 
describe behavior in institutional settings where individual efforts to maximize value generate 
social waste rather than social surplus.”). 
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facto communications regime.   But this is quite a bare description.  In the sections 
that follow, we can see what government has done in the face of conflicts between 
challengers and incumbents, and how copyright’s communications’ policy has 
actually developed.
D. Communications Policy, 1900-1976
1. The Birth of the Recording Industry
The birth of the recording industry in the late 1890s and early 1900s is the 
model, for better of for worse, for copyright’s communications policy in the 20th 
century.  The recording industry, predating today’s online distribution via cable 
and other media, was the original technological free-rider—the first to build a 
business whose success depended, in part, on the incidence of copyright 
arbitrage.74
The recording industry pioneers were the manufacturers of piano rolls and of 
“talking machines,” or early record players.    Early versions of these technologies 
were introduced in the late 1890s.75   By 1902, at least a million piano rolls, each 
representing a copyrighted song, were in distribution.76   The record industry grew 
even faster:  by 1899, 2.8 million records had been sold.77  These mechanical 
reproductions were produced without paying any licensing fees to the owners of 
the respective copyrights.78
Technologically, the player piano and the record player were each the 
“receiver” for a new form of mass media—the paper piano roll and the record, 
respectively.   A single purchase of copyrighted sheet music could be transformed 
74 For a discussion on copyright arbitrage, see Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price 
Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (applying economic models of price discrimination to 
copyright law).
75 See Jessica Litman, Copyirght Law as Communications Policy: Convergence of Paradigms and 
Cultures, 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 337, 350 nn. 69-70 (2002) (noting that composers did not 
earn royalties from these distribution mechanisms).
76 See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908) (“The record 
disclosed that in the year 1902 … that from one million to one million and a half of such 
perforated musical rolls … were made in this country in that year.”).
77 See Andre Millard, AMERICA ON RECORD: A HISTORY OF RECORDED SOUND 49 (1995) .
78 See White-Smith Publishing, 209 U.S. at 16-18; Litman, supra note 75, at 350 n.70.
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by the recording industry into rolls and records that reached tens of thousands of 
listeners.  But the success of mechanical recordings as a mass media 
instrumentality sparked a conflict with the incumbent industry:  publishers of 
sheet music.79
a. The Rhetoric
The rhetoric of the early recording industry conflict is both independently 
fascinating and a template for other conflicts that followed.   The incumbent 
owners of copyrights adopted a theme familiar to present ears:  they depicted the 
recording industry as irresponsible pirates whose reckless copying of music 
threatened to destroy American creativity.   What was in retrospect a battle over 
the impact of new technology was at that time portrayed as a threat to traditional 
values and artistic development.  As composer John Phillip Sousa informed 
Congress:
These talking machines are going to ruin the artistic development of music 
in this country.  When I was a boy … in front of every house in the summer 
evenings you would find young people together singing the songs of the 
day or old songs.   Today you hear these infernal machines going night and 
day.   We will not have a vocal chord left.   The vocal chord will be 
eliminated by a process of evolution, as was the tail of man when he came 
from the ape.80
Another line of argument portrayed the recording industry (“The Talking 
Machine Trust”) as a dishonest, monopolistic business.  A model letter written for 
composers stated the case: “What do I see?   I see my compositions … stolen bodily 
79 There were a number of legal battles between the two camps.  See, e.g. White-Smith 
Publishing, 209 U.S. 1 (holding that 1897 Act did not assign composers right to piano roll 
reproduction of composition); Stern v. Rosey, 17 App.D.C. 562 (C.A.D.C. 1901) (refusing to hold 
phonograph presentation of sounds as a “copy” within the meaning of existing statute); 
Kennedy et al. v. McTammany, 33 F. 584 (C.C.D.Mass 1988) (holding that perforated strips of 
paper used in tune-producing organettes do not violate copyrighted music of the same tune).
80 Argument on H.R. 11,943, to Amend Title 60, Chapter 3, of Revised Statutes of the United 
States, Relating to Copyrights Before the House Comm. On Patents, 59th Cong. 24 (1906) [hereinafter 
1906 Hearings] (testimony of John Philip Sosa), in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT 
ACT (E.Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976).
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by the phonographic trust and piano-player combination, and ground out daily 
from thousands of cylinders, disks, and rolls, without paying me or anyone of us 
one solitary penny… [Congress must] assist in protecting me against such robbery, 
such unfairness, and such a terrible disadvantage.”81
A slightly more sophisticated argument presented the recording industry’s 
activities as a threat to the incentives to compose music in the first place.   In a 1907 
letter to the New York Globe and Advertiser, the Authors and Composers 
Copyright League put things as follows:
[T]he “Talking Machine Trust” … with all the greed of a hungry wolf seizes 
upon the [successful] composition and turns out countless records and 
perforated rolls, thereby killing the sales, for it is a proven fact that as soon as 
the penny talking machines reproduce a mechanical composition it is dead as 
far as the public is concerned.
…
[Without copyright reform] the musical art and all musical industries in this 
country will languish, as the authors and composers, not receiving any royalties 
on records, and their royalties on sheet music decreasing from year-to-year, will 
have no incentive to write or compose.82
How about the challengers—the recording industry?  Sounding themes also 
familiar today, the recording industry identified itself as the inventing class, heroes 
of American ingenuity and engineering.  They portrayed the incumbent industry 
as a monopoly threat interested only in destroying a technologically advanced 
rival. 
Self-described inventor Howlett Davis testified before Congress (“without 
invitation from any source whatsoever”)83 depicted the arts as necessarily 
dependent on inventors:  “In all arts the work of the inventor will be found at the 
81Hearings on Pending Bills to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respective Copyright Before the 
Comm. on Patents of the Sen. and House,  60th Cong. 255 (1908) [hereinafter 1908 Hearings] (model 
letter to Congress in statement of Mr. John J. O’Connell) in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 
COPYRIGHT ACT (E.Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976)  
82 Id. at 257 (newspaper Letter in statement of Mr. John J. O’Connell).
83 Id. at 104 (statement of Hewlett Davis).
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foundation of the progress and prosperity of the country.”  Inventors served the 
people: “the farmer or the workingman,” he argued, depends on his record player 
“to relax the tension of daily labor,” thanks not to the composer “who rarely 
reached them. 84 He condemned expanding copyright: it would “reach out and
take from the inventor the product of his brain and deliver it over to the 
composer.”85 In his view, “so far as the mass of the people of this country is 
concerned, the work of the composer is infinitesimal as compared to the work of 
the inventor.”86
Inventors also argued that an expanded copyright would defeat their vested 
rights, both as an industry and, more particularly, the vested rights of inventors 
holding patents to mechanical players.   Expanded copyright, Davis argued 
“practically depreciates or destroys the value of my inventions or machines … as 
well as destroying in part of whole my existing patent rights.”87 His view, 
evidently, was that the patent grant included a right to be free from copyrights that 
might interfere with the value of the patent.
George Pound, representing two manufacturers, argued that when “great 
vested interests have grown up … it is not right to destroy them for the benefit of a 
half dozen alleged composers allied with a life-long and absolutely exclusive 
monopoly.  The composer gets on the sheet music all that he is entitled to get.88
A more strategic theme advanced by the early recording industry played on 
contemporary fears of monopoly trusts, particularly those with a foreign element.   
In a clever turn, much of the recording industry turned against a single manufactur 
of player pianos, the Æolian company.  They argued that the demand for copyright 
expansion had nothing to do with composer welfare, but was rather part of a grand 
international conspiracy.   Hewlett Davis described the alleged collusion between 
publishers and composers as “a complete monopolistic octopus, in which the 
Æolian Company forms the head and the brains, the Music Publishers Association, 
84 1908 Hearings, supra note 81,  at 104 (statement of G. Howlett Davis).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 101.
88 1908 Hearings, supra note 81,  at 98 (statement of Mr. George W. Pound)..
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressCopyright’s Communications Policy
28
the body, the independent publishers, the writhing arms, and the composers the 
suckers and baiters.”89
A series of inflammatory 1908 editorials in the newssheet “Musical Age” 
depicted a sinister international “syndicate” agitating for copyright’s expansion.90
It asked:  “who raises this hue and cry and creates this clamorous demand for new 
and drastic [copyright] legislation?   Is it the author?  [No] … It is the speculator 
and gambler.”  After detailing the syndicate’s origins in France (connected to a 
shadowy figure named Lucien Vives), the Æolian company was named as local 
outpost of the global conspiracy. “In this country, it is the Æolian company which 
assumes the role of ‘chief speculator.’”
A final argument, again present in contemporary debate, was that the 
recording industry was actually helping composers by spurring the sales of sheet 
music; hence, no change to copyright was needed.   A representative of the talking 
machine lobby stated that “[i]t is impossible that there should be any sales of 
records of the composition without there being a corresponding sale of sheet 
music.  Each may help each other, but phonographic reproduction is certainly a 
powerful stimulus to the sale of sheet music.”91
This argument—that the new technology of dissemination will ultimately 
aid composers irrespective of the level of copyright protection granted to their 
works—remains a persistent theme in the defense of challenger activity.
b. Copyright Settlement
We are now in a position to understand the legal course of events that led to 
settlement.   The incumbents, unsurprisingly, took the lead.   Early on, publishers 
asked lower courts to find piano rolls (in 1888) and records (1901) an infringement 
of copyright rights.92  These efforts failed.93
89 1908 Hearings, supra note 81, at 98 (statement of G. Howlett Davis).
90 M. Dorian, The Men Behind, The Musical Age, Feb. 29, 1908.  
91 1908 Hearings, supra note 81, at 295 (statement of Mr. Frank L. Dyer). 
92 See Stern v. Rosey, 17 App.D.C. 562 (C.A.D.C. 1901) (refusing to hold phonograph 
presentation of sounds as a “copy” within the meaning of existing statute); Kennedy et al. v. 
McTammany, 33 F. 584 (C.C.D.Mass 1988) (holding that perforated strips of paper used in tune-
producing organettes do not violate copyrighted music of the same tune).
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The incumbents, making the piracy arguments detailed above, then moved to 
Congress, achieving through a publisher’s conference a draft copyright bill that 
would have granted composers full rights in mechanical recordings.94  At the same 
time, in 1906, a new effort was made to obtain an appellate decision finding 
mechanical recordings to be infringing copies:  the test lawsuit was litigated all the 
way to the Supreme Court.   This was the now famous “piano-roll” case White-
Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.95
Unfortunately for the incumbents, the Supreme Court was unwilling to extend 
copyright in the manner requested by the incumbents.  It ruled, as the earlier courts 
had, that a “copy” in the statute was a “reproduction or duplication of the 
original,” which the perforated paper roll evidently was not.   In hindsight it is 
clear that the decision could have gone either way.96   The Court repeatedly relied 
on the fact that piano rolls were not visually similar to sheet music—a curious 
means to adjudge the meaning of a “copy” of an aural work. 
Many have criticized the purported formalism of the White-Smith Court.97
Reflecting early 20th century practice, the Court declined to explain the reasons or 
policy behind its decision.  But the decision, whether consciously or not, put the 
Court squarely in the midst of communications policy.   The doctrinal, and rather 
clumsy, rationale was the difference between a given work and its means of 
expression.  The Court, critically, stated that “the statute has not provided for the
protection of the intellectual conception apart from the thing produced, however 
93 See Stern, 17 App.D.C. 562; Kennedy, 33 F. 584.
94 See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 
284-85 (1989).
95 209 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1908).
96 The Court’s holding in White-Smith was premised on the notion that piano rolls did not 
constitute a physical copy of the work.  See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18.  The Court did so 
because the rolls were not directly accessible to humans, and did so over the objection of Justice 
Holmes that “[o]n principle anything that mechanically reproduces that collocation of sounds 
ought to be held a copy.” White Smith, 209 U.S. at 20 (Holmes, J., concurring).  This conception 
of fixation was quickly overturned by the copyright statute in 1909.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) 
(defining fixation); see also, Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 Duke L.J. 
683, 716 n.140 (2003) (discussing meaning of fixation).
97 See, e.g., Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622 (2001).
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meritorious such conception may be.” 98  It instead “has provided for the making 
and filing of a tangible thing, against the publication and duplication of which it is 
the purpose of the statute to protect the composer.”99
The distinction between the “intellectual conception” and the “tangible thing” 
therein described is difficult to defend or maintain.   If copyright is merely 
protection against the copying of a “tangible thing,” how could it protect 
adaptations to other languages, media, or performance rights for which the law has 
already provided?  Yet the entire Court signed on to the opinion—even Justice 
Holmes, whose subsequent body of copyright writings would act against the 
principle stated in White-Smith.100
For this reason we must look to other motivations and concerns.  One cannot 
help but notice that the effect of the decision was to place a limit on the market 
power of the effective owner of the “intellectual conception,” namely, the 
incumbent industry. The decision also set an institutional precedent (though one 
unevenly followed), of deciding technologically-sensitive copyright cases in favor 
of a challenger industry in a manner likely to force Congress’s hand. The denial of 
protection in the context of a technologically innovative market entrant will 
resurface in the history that follows.  Seventy-six years later, the Sony Betamax 
decision would cite White-Smith as the origin of this “policy:”  
Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to 
Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for 
copyrighted materials.   Congress has the constitutional authority and 
institutional capability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of 
competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new 
technology.101
98 White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17.
99 White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17.
100 In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) Justice Holmes held the film Ben-Hur to 
infringe a copyright on the novel, holding that “[t]he essence of the matter in the case last 
supposed is not the mechanism employed, but that we see the event or story lived.”  See also
Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U.S. 591 (1917) discussed in text accompanying notes infra 114-117.
101 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S., at 431 (1984).
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In practice, the decision to “defer” to Congress activates copyright’s 
communications regime, and the beginnings of a process of negotiated settlement 
between the parties to the conflict.
* * *
Following White-Smith publishers and the mechanical machine manufacturers 
moved quickly for a legislative settlement.   Why settlement?   
First, the White-Smith litigation and the failure of earlier Congressional efforts 
provided important information.  Despite all efforts, the publishing industry was 
unlikely to get either the courts or Congress to provide a full-strength copyright 
that it might use in its contest with the nascent recording industry.   At the same 
time, by this point both challengers and incumbents began to represent a serious 
threat to one another.  Following White-Smith, composers and publishers risked an 
ongoing decay of their profitability because of their inability to extract income from 
the recording industry.   Conversely, the recording industry still faced some 
possibility that publishers would succeed in their efforts to extend copyright to 
mechanical recordings and use this power against them.
Under these conditions the two parties settled on a statutory “royalty” scheme 
that was the first compulsory license system.  The settlement set a fixed, universal 
rate:  2 cents per song, per copy.   This settlement was primarily achieved during 
sessions in 1908, and was codified as § 1(e) of the 1909 copyright act.102
The nature of the settlement was as follows.   One the one hand, Congress 
extended the copyright in compositions to mechanical recordings.   In exchange, 
the recording industry received statutorily guaranteed access to all copyrighted 
compositions provided they pay a standard fee. So long as the composer agreed or 
“knowingly acquiesced” to an initial recording (an important condition), anyone 
willing to pay the statutory fee would then be entitled to use any copyrighted 
composition to record his own version of the song.
This mechanical license scheme survives to the present day.  Among academics 
it is occasionally defended for its reduction in transaction costs, but more typically 
102 See HARRY HENN, COPYRIGHT PRIMER 207 n.2 (1979).
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berated for its inflexibility and insensitivity to changing economic conditions.103
Yet, interestingly, neither party has made a serious effort to repeal the mechanical 
license system.  Representatives of composers did not argue for its repeal in the 
1976 Copyright Act104 and today it is even defended, both by representatives of 
composers and by the music industry.105   The only change has been the effort to 
make the license fee adjustable.106
2.  The Wireless Age
“Radio is yet in its infancy,” the doctor concluded, as he rose to go. “But one 
thing is certain. In the lifetime of those who witnessed its birth it will become a 
giant--but a benevolent giant who, instead of destroying will re-create our 
civilization.”107
Thus spoke Dr. Dale, sage of the 1922 book Radio Boys.108  He had reason to 
think radio was on the rise.  Just one year before, a record 300,000 listened as Jack 
Demsey knocked out Georges Carpentier to take the heavyweight boxing title.  For 
perhaps the first time in history, more people experienced the event distally than 
locally, most listening at “radio halls.”109  On the authority of the Wireless Age:  
103 See, e.g., Trotter Hardy, Copyright and New-Use Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 659, 699-702 
(1999) (criticizing compulsory licensing regimes as price-fixing.); Robert Merges, Contracting 
into Liability Rules:  Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1293, 1300 (1996) (same).
104 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
105 See, e.g., Ken Anderson, “Preserve the Compulsory License,” Billboard, June 11, 1994, at 
6 (arguing that rescinding the compulsory license would create industry turmoil and potential 
of monopolization.).
106 The price is now set by a system of ad hoc Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 801 (creating the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels).  For the year 2004, the 
mechanical license rate is 8.5 cents per song, or 1.65 cents per minute playing time, whichever is 
greater.  See Copyright Office, Mechanical License Rates, 
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/m200a.html (last visited Jan 31, 2004).
107 Allen Chapman, The Radio Boys Trailing a Voice 60 (1922).
108 Id.
109 See The Wireless Age, August, 1921, page 11-21, available at 
http://earlyradiohistory.us/century2.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2004).
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“The magic of the radio telephone had accomplished new wonders. A daring idea 
had become a fact.”110
But the wonder of radio also gave birth to a festering, drawn-out conflict:  a 
decades-long war between the broadcast industry and an alliance of sheet-music 
publisher, composers and songwriters.  The conflict differs in an important respect 
from the piano-roll and cable-broadcast disputes that came before and after it, 
respectively.  There was no incumbent broadcast industry interested in destroying 
or stopping radio.  Instead, existing authors wanted radio to succeed, but they also 
wanted to milk radio for as much money as possible.   Radio’s interest in paying as 
little as possible for its primary input created the conflict described in what follows.
Commercial radio, like every new industry preceding and succeeding it, 
began by trying to circumvent copyright protection of the underlying works.   
Unlike modern radio with its “disk-jockeys,” early 1920s broadcast usually meant 
setting up a microphone for a performance, either within the studio or at a concert 
hall.111  Since the music was already purchased or playing, ignoring copyright was 
easy.   But unlike its predecessors, the gramophone industry, radio faced a better 
organized adversary: the American Society of Broadcasters, Composers and 
Publishers (ASCAP).  
In 1913, the legend goes, composer Victor Herbert was dinning in New 
York’s Shanley restaurant when the in-house orchestra struck up one of his songs, 
“Sweethearts.”112 He complained to the proprietor, who presented him with a 
theory of copyright liability: since no admission was being charged, the 
performance was not “for profit,” and the restaurant not guilty of infringement.
Herbert was determined to prove him wrong and in 1914, with others, founded 
ASCAP, a collection of 170 authors and composers of music, along with twenty-
two publishers of sheet music.113  ASCAP’s first target was the restaurant and the 
performance that had attracted Herbert’s ire.  In 1917’s Herbert v. Shanley Co., 
110 Id.
111 See Stephen Davis, The Law of the Air in THE RADIO INDUSTRY:  THE STORY OF ITS 
DEVELOPMENT 186-87 (1928).   
112 See Leonard Allen, “The Battle of Tin Pan Alley,” 181 HARPERS 514 (1940); Samuels, 
supra n. 37, at 41.
113 See Melvin Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.19 (1988).
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ASCAP convinced the Supreme Court that public performance in restaurants, 
despite no fee being charged, was an unauthorized “public performance for 
profit.”114
 Justice Holmes wrote a simple three-paragraph opinion, concluding that 
since restaurants are not charities, when they play music it must be in the interest 
of profit even if they don’t charge at the door.  Restaurants, he observed, are not 
“eleemosynary.” 115  They provide music to provide their customers, “people 
having limited powers of conversation,” “a luxurious pleasure not be had from 
eating a silent meal.”116 In short, “if music did not pay, it would be given up. If it 
pays, it pays out of the public's pocket. Whether it pays or not, the purpose of 
employing it is profit, and that is enough.”
The opinion is simple economics, but underlying it is a substantive view of 
rights of the copyright holder.  Holmes’ opinion here and in his other writings117
saw copyright as a commercial property to a extent never reached before.  His 
view, now mainstream, presumed the copyright owner should have the power to 
demand a license for every revenue-stream dependent on the copyrighted work—
even revenue from adaptations to other media, or revenue arising from improved
restaurant atmospherics.   In any case, the holding put ASCAP in the business in 
which it remains today:  offering “blanket” licenses to restaurants, dance halls, and 
other places that perform music.118  The blanket licenses, for a fixed percentage 
dependent on the venue, allow the performance of all of the works written by 
ASCAP members (members assigned their performance rights to ASCAP for this 
purpose).119  It was these blanket licenses that ASCAP offered radio broadcasters, 
at first for free or for very low prices. But much of the broadcast radio industry said 
no, and several decades of ferocious animosity ensued.
114 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
115 Id. at 595. 
116 Id.
117 See, e.g., Kalem Co. v. Harder Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (finding jobber contributory liable for 
unauthorized film version of book); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 
(1903) (holding commercial advertisement copyrightable).
118 See Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. American Soc. Of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers, 546 F.Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
119 See id. at 276.
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Radio, facing the demands of ASCAP and feeling a sense of mutual 
grievance, decided to get organized.  On April 25, 1923, fifty-four broadcasting 
men met at the Drake Hotel in Chicago.120  The product of their meeting was the 
National Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”), and its first priority was getting 
radio out of the copyright statute.121  Within a year, the NAB had a Bill in the 
Senate that would have excempted radio from copyright liability altogether.122  The 
Bill, S. 2600, proposed to amend § 1 of the 1909 Act, adding:
Copyright control shall not extend to public performances, whether for 
profit or without profit, of musical compositions where such performance is 
made from printed or written sheets or by reproducing devices issued 
under the authority of the owner of the copyright, or by use of radio or 
telephone or both.123
But the bill died, and the in retrospect the radio problem probably never came 
closer to a legislative solution.
The broadcaster-composer conflict was open by the time of the 1925 Radio 
Convention, called by the Commerce Department, where an early effort was made 
to settle the dispute.   Notes from the meeting show that the respective sides agreed 
upon several points, including that “there can be no continuation of broadcasting 
unless musical compositions are made available to broadcasters upon a fair, 
equitable, and permanent basis.” 124  However, “all attempted solutions through 
negotiations … proved unavailing.”125  It was resolved that Congress should settle 
things, but it never did.
120 See NAB: The First 75 Years, available at http://www.nab.org/about/timeline.asp (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2004)..
121 See Angela J. Cambell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 720 n.49 
(1999)
122 To Amend the Copyright Act: Hearings on S. 2600, 68th Cong, 1st Sess. 9-14 (1924) 
(statements of E.F. McDonald and Paul B. Klugh).
123 S. 2600, 94th Cong. (1924).
124 Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference and Recommendations for the 
Regulation of Radio 41-42 (Nov. 9-11, 1925).
125 Id.
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The parties were probably unwilling to settle because each was in the midst 
of pursuing its own legal strategy seeking total victory.    While NAB
unsuccessfully petitioned Congress, ASCAP was doing far better in the courts.126
Unlike in White-Smith and later cases, no radio cases reached the Supreme Court, 
mainly because the holdings followed Herbert.  So instead it was the Sixth Circuit 
whose word became policy for radio.127
In 1924 ASCAP brought a test case against radio station WLW Cincinnati for 
its unlicensed broadcast of a song named “Dreamy Melody.”128   The legal question 
was whether radio broadcast was in fact a “public performance for profit” under 
the statute.   The Sixth Circuit, following Holmes in Herbert v. Shanley Co.,
answered the question “yes.”129  Said the court: “the artist is consciously 
addressing a great, though unseen and widely scattered audience, and is therefore 
participating in a public performance.”130
What of White-Smith’s practice of leaving new technologies to Congress?  The 
broadcasters did in fact argue that the fate of radio was better handled by the 
legislature, and Judge Mack duly noted that “bills have been introduced in both 
House and Senate to permit broadcasting without infringing copyrights.”131
However, while agreeing that the final status was “eminently [a matter] for 
considered legislation,” the court nonetheless felt it had a duty to “decide whether 
and to what extent statutes covering the subject matter generally … are, fairly 
construed, applicable to the new situation.”132   The extension of the Copyright 
126 The litigation brought by composers was quite successful, particularly with respect to 
the public performance right.  See, e.g., Jerome H. Remick v. American Automobile Accessories 
Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925) (enjoining defendant from radio broadcasting); M. Witmark & 
Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 780 (D.N.J. 1923) (holding that broadcasting in 
department store  was “publicly for profit” within the meaning of the Copyright Act); Harms et 
al. v. Cohen, 279 F. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922) (assessing liability against a theater employing an 
organist playing copyrighted musical compositions).
127 See infra notes 127 to 132 and accompanying text.
128 Remick., 5 F.2d 411.
129 Id. at 412.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 411.
132 Id. at 412.
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Act’s text to a new technology—the opposite approach to that adopted in White-
Smith and later Supreme Court cases—was a turning point in the history of the
radio conflict. 
ASCAP’s victory in the Sixth Circuit carried forward to other courts and other 
decisions;133 the Supreme Court denied certiorari.   The radio broadcasters had lost 
the first round.   They had no legislation and no excuse.   By 1931, they had little 
recourse but to begin paying for ASCAP blanket licenses, and most began doing so.  
It may be correct, as Jane Ginsburg argues, that the radio courts did not sense 
any risk that ASCAP wanted to destroy radio, and that this may have affected both 
their decisions and the Supreme Court’s denials of certiorari.134  But if one goal of 
the radio cases was to settle the relationship between radio and copyright once and 
for all, they were a failure.  The declaration of the rights of the copyright holders 
was not a settlement of the conflict.  The fight moved past copyright to other legal 
strategies which served, as a 1941 commentator put it, to “deaden the effect of the 
copyright law.”135  After another three decades of continuous conflict the antitrust 
law eventually imposed the settlement that the copyright courts avoided.  
In the mid-1930s, the NAB pushed the federal “Duffy Bill,” targeting the 
remedies instead of the scope of copyright.  Because actual damages from 
copyright infringement could be minimal or difficult to demonstrate, the 
Broadcasters noted that it was only the in terrorum effect of statutory damages that 
compelled compliance.  The Duffy Bill would have repealed the statutory damage 
provisions of the 1909 copyright law.136  As a commentator in the 1940s stated, “If 
the minimum statutory damages were abolished, radio owners could knowingly 
ignore the copyright laws. . . .”137 But the Duffy Bill, with only the broadcasters 
behind it, died.
133 Pastime Amusement Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 2 F.2d 1020, 1020 (4th Cir. 1924); M. 
Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 779-80 (D.N.J. 1923).
134 See Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 1621.
135 See Marcus Cohn, Music Radio, and the Sherman Act, 29 GEORGETOWN L. J. 407, 415 (1941).
136 S. 2465, 7th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
137 Cohn, supra note 135, at 415.
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As early as 1926, the NAB also began pressuring the Justice Department to seek 
antitrust enforcement against ASCAP, but to no avail.138  In September 1933, the 
Broadcasters filed their own private Antitrust suit,139 and in 1934 the Justice 
Department, with the broadcasters as cheering squad, changed its mind and filed 
its own an antitrust petition against ASCAP.140   But the Department asked for an 
adjournment after just two weeks of trial.141   The radio broadcaster’s legal strategy 
was again stalled.
Having no luck with the federal government, the radio broadcasters turned to 
the states.  The result was called “a series of comprehensive and systematic attacks 
on ASCAP, through the medium of state legislatures.”142   The methods of choice 
were “anti-monopoly” statutes that declared it illegal for owners of copyrighted 
works to combine for purposes of fixing licensing fees.143  In other words, the 
Broadcasters sought, and obtained, state statutes making ASCAP illegal.   Over 
several years, the broadcasters succeeded in introducing such laws in 35 States and 
passing them in ten.144  Unfortunately for broadcasters, however, courts quickly 
found the state laws preempted by the Federal Copyright power. 145  NAB’s efforts 
had failed again.
As an ASCAP commentator in 1939 put it, the broadcasters “had resorted to 
every conceivable device and stratagem to destroy the right of composers and 
138 In 1926, the Justice Department investigated ASCAP but found no reason to bring an 
antitrust suit.   See Cohn, supra note 135, at 424 n.91.
139 See Pennsylvania Broadcasting Co. v. Buck, (S.D.N.Y. Filed Sept. 7, 1933).
140 See United States v. ASCAP, No. 78-388 (S.D.N.Y., filed August 30, 1934).
141 Why they stopped the case is not entirely clear.  According to Lionel Sobel, it was in 
part because the broadcasters and ASCAP agreed on a 5-year compromise agreement during 
the trial.  See Lionel Sobel, The Music Business and the Sherman Act: An Analysis of the Economic 
Realities of Blanket Licensing, 3 LOY. ENT. L. J. 1, 3 (1983).
142 Cohn, supra note 135, at 416.
143 Two examples are Fla. Gen. Laws 1937, Vol. I, c. 17807, discussed in Gibbs v. Buck, 307 
U.S. 66, 69 (1939), and Washington Laws 1937, c. 218, p. 1070, discussed in Buck v. Gallagher, 
307 U.S. 95, 97 (1939).
144 See Cohn, supra note 135, at 417 nn.60-63 (collecting state statutes).
145 See, e.g., Gibbs, 307 U.S. at 66; Buck v. Swansom, 33 F.Supp. 377 (D. Neb. 1939); Buck v. 
Harton, 33 F.Supp. 1014 (M.D. Tenn. 1940); Notes, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 461 (1939) (collecting cases).
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authors to bargain collectively. … All to no purpose.”146 But the NAB was 
persistent.   It compared its struggle against ASCAP to the fight against Hitler and 
redoubled its efforts:  “War is hell, whether its purpose is to preserve democracy in 
Europe against a madcap dictator or to preserve it in radio against an arbitrary 
totalitarian ASCAP.”147
The broadcasters’ breakthrough came in 1941.  That year, NAB ran a successful 
year-long boycott of all ASCAP songs, relying instead on songs in the public 
domain and those from the industry’s own performance rights organization, 
Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”). 148  This time fate and history were on the 
broadcast’s industry’s side.  ASCAP didn’t control every composer and every song:  
it required composers to achieve a minimum of five hit songs before joining. 149
This standard excluded less well known artists and also “hillbilly” and “race” 
music (now known as “country,” and “rhythm & blues,” respectively).150
Switching to playlists comprised of BMI and public domain songs was therefore 
manageable, if not ideal.151
The Justice Department, meanwhile, was convinced to bring yet another 
antitrust action.  This time, ASCAP decided to negotiate a settlement, resulting in 
146 E.C. Mill, The ASCAP View, 11 AIR. L. REV. 394, 397 (1940). 
147 Editorial, Broadcasting, Oct 1, 1939.
148  In  1940,  the  NAB  organized  an  ASCAP  boycott—members,  for  about  a  year,  only 
played  songs  from  their  own,  competing  performing  rights  society,  Broadcast  Music  Inc. 
(“BMI”).  See Cohn, supra note 135, at 420-421.
149 See Paul Kingsbury, BMI 50TH ANNIVERSARY HISTORY BOOK 2 (1990). (“At one time, 
many types of music had limited access to the mainstream of the American music business, and 
to the American audience at large.”).
150 See id.
151 Herman Finkelstein, an ASCAP attorney, stated in 1954 that during the boycott “the 
value of radio sets was substantially lessened for those who enjoyed the best in popular music.”  
Herman FinkelsteinI, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 275, 287 (1954).  Conversely, some radio 
stations reported that their public praised them for the new type of music they broadcasted 
during the boycott.   See VARIETY, Dec. 25, 1940 at 24.
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the 1941 consent decree. 152  That, in turn, was renegotiated in 1950,153 after the 
movie industry joined in and filed a successful antitrust action against ASCAP.154
The details of the antitrust litigation against ASCAP have been told many 
times.155  What is relevant here is the fact that the results of the antitrust litigation 
and settlement were quite similar to those of copyright settlements achieved 
elsewhere.
The 1950 decree limited the scope of copyright in compositions rather like a 
statutory or compulsory license.   Section VI of the decree ordered ASCAP to grant 
blanket licenses to its copyrights, and section IV required that such licenses be 
granted non-exclusively and without discrimination.156   These are, of course, the 
basic features of a compulsory license: it guarantees that the work will be available, 
and it remains available regardless of how many other parties have already been 
granted a compulsory license.
The 1950 consent decree, like a statutory license, also had something to say 
about pricing.  Unlike the mechanical license, which set a statutory price (two cents 
per song per recording), the 1950 consent decree gave an Article III court the final 
say in music pricing.   Section IX of the 1950 consent decree required ASCAP to 
notify users of its fees, which were to be reasonable.  In the event, within 60 days, 
that ASCAP and its users were unable to agree on a price, appeal was available to 
the District Court, which would set a “reasonable price.”157
152  United States v. ASCAP, 1940-1943 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
153 See United States v. ASCAP, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 62,595 at 63,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
154 See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
155 See, e.g., Richard Ergo, ASCAP and the Antitrust Laws: The Story of a Reasonable 
Compromise, 1959 DUKE L. J. 258 (1959); Susan Stager, Musical Performing Rights in the Television 
Industry: Has The Blanket License Finally Seen Its Demise?, 14 SW. U. L. REV. 569, 572-573 (1984).
156 See United States v. ASCAP, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 62,595 at 63,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
157 See id.
Rate-setting requests have been brought to the court; but have always been settled before 
the merits are reached.  See Garner, United States v. ASCAP: The Licensing Provisions of the 
Amended Final Judgment of 1950, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 119, 127-128 (1976).
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Under these terms, the system of copyrights in music compositions 
effectively became a form of liability, as opposed to property, regime.158
Broadcasters were not liable for infringement as long as they paid a price set by the 
government.   The story of the birth of Radio, in short, has more in common with 
other copyright conflicts than meets the eye.   The initial decision of the copyright 
courts to extend full copyright in radio broadcasts did not prevent the emergence 
of a compulsory licensing scheme.   
3.  Cable Television & the Broadcasting Industry
The third major example of what I have described as copyright’s settlement 
function arises out of the bitter mid-century conflict between broadcasters and the 
upstart cable industry.   Reduced to its essentials, beginning the late 1950s the 
broadcast industry and its affiliates mounted a large, successful effort to contain 
the growth of cable using every regulatory and political device at their disposal,159
while the cable industry capitalized on its unregulated status to erode the 
dominant position of broadcast.160
A general (albeit uneasy) settlement to the conflict was achieved by the late 
1970s through a compromise on copyright legislation and the rescission of the most 
onerous of the FCC’s regulations and pseudo-copyrights.161   With this settlement, 
158 For the seminal discussion of property versus liability rules, see Guido Calabresi and A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
159 For a very brief history of the relationship among cable, the FCC, and Congress, see 
Ashotsh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass Media, and the 
Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 150-55 (1995).
160 See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum 
Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: an Essay on Airwave Allocation 
Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 417-18 (2001).
161 For Court decisions, see for example Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414 (1974) (refusing to apply copyright law in the cable 
retransmission context); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390, 399 (1968) (holding 
that cable tv is a “viewer” and therefore does not “perform” within the meaning of the 
controlling copyright law).  Congress “settled” this dispute by promulgating a cable
compulsory licensing scheme.  See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
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cable began a smoother accession to its present dominantion of television 
dissemination.162
a. The Challenge
Cable was not, at first, a challenger to the broadcast industry.   The first cable 
systems, then known as “community antenna” television (CATV), developed in 
rural areas in the late 1940s.   The goal of the early deployments was modest:  
solving the problem of bringing broadcast television to remote or mountainous 
areas otherwise left in the dark.163  In the late 1940s, early cable operators in places 
like Astoria, Orgeon (the site of the first recognized CATV deployment) erected 
large, community antennas to bring distant signals to small towns.164  The 
broadcast signal captured by the community antenna was retransmitted to people’s 
homes using physical cables.165
In this early manifestation, cable was simply a complement to broadcast 
service.166   By allowing the broadcast signal to reach areas not served by broadcast, 
it expanded the television audience to the advantage of broadcast stations.   This 
had changed, however, by the late 1950s, when broadcasters realized cable’s threat 
as a successor industry. 
Broadcasters had reason to fear.  Cable technology had two clear advantages 
over broadcast technology that are now obvious:  programming diversity167 (more 
162 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) § 2(a)(2)-(5) (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)-(5)) (detailing the 
increase in cable viewership and noting that “the cable television industry has become a 
dominant nationwide video medium.”).
163 See Kent D. Wakeford, Note, Municipal Cable Franchising: An Unwarranted Intrusion into 
Competitive Markets, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 233, 237 n.16 and accompanying text (1995).
164 See id. at 237 note15
165 See id.
166 See Patick Murphy, 1993 Retransmission Consent: A Mixed Signal for Cable Copyright, 17 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 237, 240 (1993) (describing this model).
167 In the 1960s, diversity meant the importing of signals from other areas using microwave 
transmission technology.  See Teleprompter Corp., 415 U.S. at 400, n.4 (1974).  For example, to 
create an attractive service, a cable operator in Philadelphia might import independent stations 




channels) and si gnal quality.   In face of this competitive threat, the broadcast 
industry adopted the familiar arguments of piracy,168 unfair competition,169 and 
economic disruption favored by incumbent industries.  It adopted, in other words, 
the arguments of the sheet music manufacturers in the piano-roll era and of the 
record companies today. 170  Along with these claims of unfair competition, the 
broadcast industry added appeals to “localism,” the national policy of subsidizing 
the existence of local broadcasting stations in every community.
The unfair competition or piracy claim was simply that cable operators, because 
they did not pay for the content they retransmitted, were stealing content and 
competing unfairly.   Rhetorically, the broadcast industry openly and repeatedly 
accused cable operators of “signal piracy.”   As the copyright office summarized 
their argument in 1965:
[Cable operators] neither need or deserve a free ride at the expense of 
copyright owners … The activities of the CATV operators constitute a “clear 
moral wrong” comparable to the old practice of “bicycling” movies from 
one theatre to another in order to get two performances out of a single 
license.171
As a local broadcaster testified in 1958, “We believe that when a community 
antenna system takes our programs out of the air, without our permission, and 
168 This was the rhetoric surrounding, for example, the compulsory-license provisions 
allowing cable to rebroadcast captured signals.  See Mary C. Dollarhide, Surrogate Rule Making: 
Problems and Possibilities Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1017, 1027 
(1988).
169 The Supreme Court accepted the unfair competition rationale in Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I] (“In short, the must-carry 
provisions are not designed to favbor or disadvantage speech of any particular content.  Rather, 
they are meant to protect broadcast television from what Congress determined to be unfair 
competition by cable systems.”) (emphasis added).
170 See supra, text accompanying notes 80 to 91.
171 Copyright Law Revision Part 6, Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on 
the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Bill 43 (1965).
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sells that program material at a profit—and in many cases, a fantastic profit, 
indeed—this is a violation of our property rights.”172
Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Association made similar arguments on
the eve of settlement, June 1975, in testimony before congress:
If Congress exempts television—cable television—from copyright … [it] will 
not only be magnifying and sanctifying a terrible injustice, but it will have 
created a huge parasite in the marketplace, feeding and fattening itself off of 
local television stations and copyright owners of copyrighted material.  We 
do not like it because we think it wrong and unfair.173
Broadcasters associated themselves with the creation of programming content 
and linked cable with the destruction of incentives for creation.  The incumbents 
argued that the creation of programming rested on a delicate balance of incentives:  
Broadcasters paid for the creation of the programming content and received local 
advertising revenue in return, serving the public interest by creating new works.  
Cable operators, on the other hand, did not create new works and therefore 
competed unfairly.
But if cable simply carried broadcast signals, how did it endanger broadcasting 
or the creation of new works?  The broadcaster’s arguments relied on the concept 
of audience fragmentation.174  They argued that the cable operator’s practice of 
importing signals from “foreign” markets (i.e., from Memphis to St. Louis) would 
fragment the viewing audiences between local stations and the foreign imports.175
Imports would destroy advertising revenue because St. Louis advertisers, faced 
with an audience fragmented between stations of both cities, would pay less.  
Meanwhile since local advertisers in Memphis could care less about reaching 
buyers in St. Louis audiences the result was a net loss in amount broadcasters 
172 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States 
Senate, 85th Cong., Second. Sess. 3613 (1959) (statement of William C. Grove)
173 See U.S. Congress House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the 
Administation of Justice Hearings, 92d Cong. (1972) (statement of Jack Valenti), in 15 OMNIBUS 
COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 727 (George S. Grossman ed. 1976) .
174 See, e.g., U.S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 160 note 4 (detailing concerns 




could charge for advertising.176  The fragmentation problem, broadcasters charged, 
would destroy the economic viability of free television. 
The broadcast industry advanced concerns for “localism” in addition to those 
regarding audience fragmentation.177  The FCC in 1952 declared localism a goal of 
national broadcasting policy:  broadcast should “provide each community with at 
least one television broadcast station.”178   The idea was that the public interest was 
served not only by the programming of the “big three” networks, but also by local 
broadcast stations that could provide content of matters of local importance.179
Cable operators, by importing signals, were a particularly serious threat to the 
viability of local broadcasters in small markets.
Finally, even if cable did offer desirable diversity in programming, broadcasters 
argued that the goal of diversity was better achieved through more broadcast 
sta tions in every community, not the import and export of signals around the 
country.180  In particular, broadcasters promoted developing new ultra high 
frequency (UHF) stations as the preferred means for achieving programming 
diversity.181
In retrospect, the weakness of these arguments is apparent.   Cable was indeed 
a threat to broadcasting because it was a better means of disseminating television.   
Yet it did not follow that cable was also a threat to programming, because it could 
(and did) ultimately come to have an interest in the availability of new works.   In 
particular, cable, as most now recognize, was the savior of UHF broadcasting 
because it improved the weak signal strength of UHF stations.182  The key, in 
retrospect, would be to make cable a stakeholder—part of the compensation 
176 See id.
177 Localism as a concept is discussed in  Glenn O. Robinson, The Electronic First 
Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L. REV. 899, 904 (1997).
178 See Report and Order, 17 Fed. Reg. 3912 § 63 (1952). 
179 See id.
180 These arguments were reflected in the 1958 “Cox Report” on Cable Television.  See 
Kenneth Cox, The Problem of Television Service for Smaller Communities. Staff Report to the 
Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 26 December 1958. 
181 See id.
182 See Joel Rosenbloom, The “Vast Wasteland” in Retrospect, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 571, 575 
(2003) (citing Bruce M. Owen & Steven S. Wildman, Video Economics 214-15 (1992)).
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system for newly created works—without giving broadcast a tool to destroy its 
rival.   This, ultimately, was the role that the copyright liability scheme was to play.
b. Controlling the Challenger
Faced with the competitive threat of cable and armed with these arguments, 
the broadcast industry and its allies183 in the 1960s exploited all available 
regulatory means to control the growth of cable.  The industry pursued three 
separate legal strategies: common-law misappropriation arguments, copyright 
infringement litigation, and a kind of “pseudo-copyright” enforcement through 
FCC regulation.
The broadcasting industry turned first to the common law in an effort to gain 
property rights in its broadcast signals.   Beginning in the late 1950s, the 
broadcasters asked the courts to find the behavior of cable companies a violation of 
common-law misappropriation under International News Service v. Associated Press
and other common-law theories.184   The argument in these lawsuits was simple:
cable operators are stealing our product (the signal) without providing 
compensation, and are therefore competing unfairly and should be stopped.   In 
Associated Press, this basic theory had persuaded the Supreme Court to prevent one 
wire service from stealing news from another, creating a pseudo-property interest 
in “hot news.”185   The right would have served the broadcasting’s interests 
perfectly.
But these efforts failed.   In closely watched litigation, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the broadcasters’ remedy, if any, must lie in copyright.186   Pointing out that 
the broadcasters sought “what are in essence copyright interests,” the court found 
183 An example of an ally were the manufacturers of television antennas, organized as the 
Television Accessory Manufacturers’ Institute (“TAMI”), who obviously had much to lose from 
competition with cable.  See Don R. Le Duce, Cable Television and the FCC 142-143 (1972).
184 248 U.S. 215 (1918).   International News Service held that news wires have a quasi-
property right in “hot news.”  See id. at 245-46.  The broadcasters also argued for tortious 
interference with contract, see Associated Press v. International News Service, 240 F. 983, 995 
(S.D.N.Y. 1917), but the misappropriation theory received the most attention in the court of 
appeals, see Associated Press v. International News Service, 245 F. 244, 252 (2nd Cir. 1917).
185 See International News Service, 248 U.S. at 245-46.
186 Cable Vision v. KUTV Inc., 335 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1964).
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the state grounds for protecting broadcasters rights federally preempted.187
Technically, this decision came under the authority of then recently decided 
copyright preemption cases Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.188 and Compco 
Corporation v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.189 But what is interesting is the court’s 
recognition that the common law right threatened the “primary right of public 
access to all in the public domain.…”190  It reasoned that the creation of a “new 
protectible interest would interfere with the federal policy of allowing free access 
to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public 
domain.”191
On the other hand, the Federal Communications Commission was seemingly 
immune to such concerns, and the broadcasters’ strategy was here the most 
effective.   Bit-by-bit, urged on by the broadcasters, it created a regime of pseudo-
property rights and other rules that, for a time, gave the broadcast industry the 
means to control the development of the cable industry.192
While initially hesitant,193 the FCC began asserting jurisdiction in 1962.194 By 
1966, in its Second Report and Order195 the FCC had come to agree with the 
broadcasters’ substantive arguments and assume harm from cable’s existence.196
187 335 F.2d at 350.
188 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
189 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
190 335 F.2d at 350.
191 Id. at 351.
192 See infra notes 220 to 246.  See also Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The 
Deregulation of Cable Television, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77,  81-91 (1981) (documenting FCC 
activity constraining the growth of cable)
193See Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 FCC 251 (1958) (declining to exercise 
jurisdiction over cable on the ground that it was not a common carrier), reconsideration denied, 
Report and Order, Docket No. 12443, 26 F.C.C. 403, 428 (1959).  
194 The FCC assumed jurisdiction over microwave service transmitting distant TV signals 
to cable television in 1962, requiring cable systems to carry local broadcast signals as a condition 
of a microwave license to rural cable systems.  See Carter Mtn. Transmission v. F.C.C., 32 
F.C.C.2d 459 (1962), aff’d., 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.) (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
195 See Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern the 
Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations to Relay 
Television Signals to Community Antenna Sys., Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966)
196 See id. at 123-30 (attempting to limit growth of cable)
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By 1966, broadcasters had persuaded the FCC to enact a full regime of cable 
regulation that effectively protected the interests broadcasters would seek to 
protect with property rights.  The FCC rules barred duplication of local 
broadcasting (non-duplication rules),197 forced cable systems to carry local signals 
(must-carry rules),198 and barred cable operators from importing signals into any of 
the top 100 television markets unless the cable operator could obtain a waiver by 
obtaining the consent of local broadcast stations.199 These “unbelievable”200 rules, 
articulated by the FCC as a defense of localism, provided the broadcast industry 
with effective governmental protection from its nascent cable rival.   
In retrospect, the experiment with the waiver regime was something of a dry 
run for a full copyright regime.   The results were not promising.   A 1976 study 
found that during the period of 1968-1972, broadcasters agreed to just one instance 
of a waiver allowing import.201   While it may be that the regime was not given 
enough time to work, the more likely explanation is that broadcast was interested 
in starving its rival.202    It hints at some of the dangers of copyright as between 
rival disseminators, particular in early stages.
Broadcaster’s third line of attack was a copyright litigation campaign.   In 1968, 
the inevitable question of cable’s copyright liability reached the Supreme Court in 
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists.203   The case was factually simple.  A West 
Virginia cable operator had retransmitted to its customers various broadcasted 
programs.  The broadcast industry through copyright owners argued the cable’s 
197 See id. at 48.
198 See id. at 49.
199 See id. at 141.
200 Fred H. Cate, The Future of Communications Policy Making, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 2 
(1994).
201 See Botein, The New Copyright Act and Cable Television—A Signal of Change, BULL. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 4 (1976) (“[C]able operators were somehow never able to get 
consent.”).
202 Accord, Note, Copyright Protection in the Cable Television Industry, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 
648 n.105 (1982) (speculating as to the reasons for the failure).
203 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
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retransmission amounted to an unauthorized “public performance” under the 
Copyright Act.204
But the Court disagreed, ruling (5-1) that cable television was the functional 
equivalent of a more powerful antenna and that it was no more of a performer 
than an antenna manufacturer would be.205 As in White-Smith, not all of the 
reasoning apparent in the decision.  The court held that the cable operators were 
part of the audience for broadcast, and hence were not “performing” the work.
206
Yet it was clear that the cable operators were making money using copyrighted 
content—what had happened to Justice Holmes’ point that “the purpose of 
employing it is profit, and that is enough?” The Court had, moreover, in 1931 
decided a factually similar radio case in the opposite manner, holding that a hotel 
that rebroadcast radio stations into private rooms without permission was 
infringing copyright.207   Something else was clearly afoot.   Did the court actually 
believe that its decision someone served the interests of copyright holders?  Or was 
the Court defering to the Federal Communications Commission, or practicing its 
own communications policy?  
We can only get our clues from the dissent.208  Justice Fortas presented the 
policy considerations squarely, and in the language of communications policy, not 
copyright law:  “it is darkly predicted that the imposition of full liability upon all 
CATV operations could result in the demise of this new, important instrument of 
mass communications.” 209 On the other hand “it is foreseen that a decision to the 
effect that CATV systems never infringe the copyrights of the programs they carry 
would permit such systems to overpower local broadcasting stations.”210   The case, 
as he saw it, was almost pure communications policy, pitting the interests of a new 
204 See 393 U.S. at 395.
205 See id. at 414.
206See id.
207 See Buck v. Jewell LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (holding that playing 
copyrighted musical compositions broadcast from radio station via hotel loudspeakers is 
infringing performance).
208 392 U.S. at 402-8 (Fortas, J., dissenting)
209 Id. at 403-404 (Fortas, J., dissenting).   Justice Fortas would have found cable operators 
liable under the authority of Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Corp., 283 U.S. 191.
210 Id. at 404.
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telecommunications medium against a national policy of localism.  Fortas believed 
the court should act to “do as little damage as possible to traditional copyright 
principles and to business relationships,” but also favored a legislative soution: 
“until Congress legislates and relieves the embarrassment which we and the 
interested parties face.”211
The seeds of a future copyright settlement are evident from the Fortnightly
litigation.   Solicitor General Erwin Griswold suggested in his amicus brief on the 
merits that the Supreme Court could reasonably impose a copyright settlement in 
its decision.212 He asked the court to find cable broadcasters liabile, but to imply a
license in areas where broadcast signals were weak.   The Solictor General was, in 
effect, inviting the Supreme Court to write communications regulation into its 
interpretation of the copyright statute. While both majority and dissent declined 
the invitation to settle the dispute in this manner, it foreshadowed a copyright 
settlement on the horizon.
Yet where the Court wouldn’t go, the FCC was more willing.   In the aftermath 
of Fortnightly the FCC proposed granting broadcasters rights even more similar to 
copyright than did the existing regime (as if to compensate for their loss).  1968 saw 
the proposed introduction of “importation consent.”213   As the name suggests, 
under this rule, cable operators be would required to obtain the consent of the 
orginating broadcaster before importing any program into a top 100 market.214
But Congress was more interested in a copyright solution, and the proposal was 
never enacted.215
c. Settlement & Copyright
In 1970, it appeared that the predicted rise of cable technology was slowed,
if not frozen.  A law review article appearing that year declared that “[a]lthough 
cable television offers the potential of greatly increased television diversity, its 
211 Id.
212 See id. at 401 n.32.
213 See CATV Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 432 
(1968).
214 See id.
215 Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Television, 31 F.C.C.2d 115, 117 (1971) 
(letter from FCC to Senate Communications Subcommittee).
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possibilities have been left largely unrealized.”216  While cable had grown to reach 
about 6% of households, with approximately 4.5 million subscribers,217 its 
challenge to broadcast was halted at the urban border.  As economic historians 
Stanley Besen and Robert Crandall explained matters, “Cable entered the 1970s as a 
small business relegated primarily to rural areas and small communities and held 
hostage by television broadcasters to the Commission’s hope for the development 
of UHF.”218
By the end of the decade, however, cable had been released from its 
figurative prison.   Through a decade-long process of compromise, negotiation, 
FCC rulemaking and Congressional legislation, a truce of sorts was reached.   Most 
of the FCC’s pseudo-property rights and other restrictions were abandoned219 and 
what emerged was a system centered on a copyright liability regime.220   While by 
no means an aesthetic exercise, that period’s history illustrates the role the 
copyright regime played in one of the most bitter technological succession wars of 
the century. 
By 1970, broadcasters had successfully convinced the FCC to impose serious 
limits on the growth of cable.221  So why would broadcasters even want to turn to a 
copyright compromise, given that it might jeopardize a favorable status quo?  
Primarily, a copyright solution appeared more durable.   The restrictive 
regime created by the FCC was in a state of constant fluctuation and was easier to 
216 Leonard Chazen & Leonard Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television, the Visible Hand, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1820 (1970).
217 Services Volume, Television Factbook, 83-a (1982) [hereinafter TV Factbook].
218 Besen & Crandall, supra note 192, at 94.
219 That they were abandoned did not prevent their subsequent reintroduction.  The 
Federal Communications Commission in the 1980s and Congress in 1992 reintroduced various 
forms of protection for the broadcast industry.  See, e.g., Amendment of Parts 73 and 76 of the 
Commission's Rules Relating to Program Exclusivity in the Cable and Broadcast Industries, 3 
F.C.C.R. 5299, 5300 (1988) (report and order) (sydication rules); Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 521 (2004) (enacting retransmission consent).
220 This regime was the compulsory licensing system of § 111 of the 1976 Copyright Act.  17 
U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
221 Primarily through the provisions in the Second Report and Order, supra note 195. 
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change than copyright legislation would be.  New commissioners at the FCC could 
(and ultimately did) agree with the positions of cable television, jeopardizing 
broadcasting’s favorable position.   In particular, mounting evidence suggested 
that the danger of cable systems to television (as opposed to broadcasters) was 
exaggerated.222  This suggests that broadcasters may have felt pressure to convert 
their temporary regulatory advantage into a more lasting source of revenue.
For broadcasters, this problem was compounded by the growing power of the 
cable industry.   Despite the limitations on urban growth, cable continued to grow 
in rural and small markets, trebling in size between 1966 and 1970.223  The growing 
power of the cable industry suggested that the broadcasters’ ability to influence the 
regulatory and legislative process might erode over time, making a more durable 
compromise attractive.
Finally, in the late 1960s, many broadcasters began investing in cable systems.  
By 1966, broadcasters had some stake in 30 percent of cable companies.224 With 
interests on both sides, broadcasters were interested in a solution that would allow 
cable to grow in exchange for payoffs to the broadcasting industry, a purpose 
bettered served by a copyright royalty system than FCC regulations.
Yet none of this meant that broadcasters were interested in an immediate 
copyright settlement.   They still had a chance of achieving total victory: namely, a 
Supreme Court decision finding cable retransmission illegal without permission.   
It was not until the Supreme Court played its final hand in 1974225 that settlement 
became imminent.
An early blueprint of cable-broadcast settlement was the “Compromise 
Agreement of 1971,”226 representing an agreement between major cable, 
222 See Besen & Crandall, supra note 192, at 97.
223  Viewership rose from about 1.5 million viewers to 4.5 million. See TV Factbook, supra n. 
217.
224 See Patrick Parsons & Robert Frieden, THE CABLE AND SATELLITE TELEVISION INDUSTRIES
47 (1998).
225 Discussed infra at text accompanying note 232.
226 The consensus agreement is described in U.S. Congress House Comm. on the Judiciary 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administation of Justice Hearings, 92d Cong. (1972), in 14 
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broadcasting, and programming interests.   The basic outlines of the compromise 
was this:  cable, for the first time, would agree to some system of copyright 
liability, in exchange for a general loosening of FCC restrictions on entry into urban 
markets and other concessions to public service.227  While the consensus did not 
last, in the end the agreement was the starting point for a near-total deregulation of 
cable systems in exchange for copyright liability.
 The compromise, brokered in part by new FCC chairman Dean Baruch, 
began to be implemented on the regulatory side with new FCC rules that allowed 
cable systems limited importation rights in the top 100 markets. 228   The 1972 rules, 
Omnibus Copyright Revision Legislative History 502 (George S. Grossman ed., 1976) (statement 
of Rex A. Bradley).
227 See In the Matter of Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission’s Rules and 
Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems; and Inquiry into the 
Development of Communications Technology and Services to Formulate Regulatory Policy and 
Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals.  Amendment of Section 74.1107 of the Commission’s 
Rules and Regulations to Avoid Filing of repetitions Requests.  Amendment of Section 
74.1031(c) and 74.1105(a) and (b) of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations as they Relate to 
Addition of New Television Signals.  Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission’s 
Rules and Regulations Relative to Federal-State or Local Relationships in the Community 
Antenna Television System Field; and/or Formualtion of Legislative Proposals in this Respect.  
Amendment of Subpart K of Part 74 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations with Respect to 
Technical Standards for Community Antenna Television Systems, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972) 
[hereinafter 1972 Cable Television Report and Order].   As described by the chairman of the 
National Cable and Telecommunications Association, “in 1971, in an effort to break the 
regulatory impasse over cable, the Office of Telecommunications and the FCC fashioned the so 
called ‘consensus agreement’ under which the parties—broadcaster, copyright owners, and 
cable—affirmed support for copyright legislation and approved the outline for new FCC cable 
regulations.”  U.S. Congress House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and 
the Administation of Justice Hearings, 92d Cong. (1972), in 14 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 502 (George S. Grossman ed., 1976) (statement of Rex A. Bradley).
228 See 1972 Cable Television Report and Order, 36 FCC 2d 241.   These rules are highly 
complex:  they have been called “among the most complex rules and regulations ever devised 
by the mind of man.” U.S. Congress House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Administration for Justice Hearings, 92d Cong. (1972), in 14 OMNIBUS 
COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 501 (George S. Grossman ed., 1976) (Statement of Rex 
A. Bradley).   The new rules allowed cable systems to import sufficient signals to offer 3 
network plus 3 independent signals in markets 1-50, 3 network plus 2 independents in markets 
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described as “among the most complex rules and regulations ever devised by the 
mind of man” began a gradual process of FCC deregulation of the cable 
industry.229
The copyright side of the deal took 4 more years to settle through the 
legislative process.   While the major industry associations remained committed to 
the agreement, many members of the cable industry sought to defect.  For example, 
representatives of Teleprompter Corp., one of the nation’s largest cable systems, 
appeared before Congress to demand continued immunity from copyright, 
claiming that the consensus agreement was “pushed down the throat of the cable 
television industry.”230   Teleprompter and other cable operators returned to the 
position that cable systems were nothing but another form of antenna – “why 
should there be any liability when the viewer avails himself of the antenna tower 
erected by the cable television station?”231
On the other side, broadcasters made a final effort to obtain full copyright 
liability with the Teleprompter litigation.232 Teleprompter, unlike Fortnightly, was a 
signal importation case.  Columbia Broadcast Systems could point to 
Teleprompters imports, some from as far as 450 miles233 – and make the audience 
fragmentation argument described above.  Yet the Supreme Court proved 
uninterested in undoing the line drawn in the Fortnightly decision.  “’Broadcasters 
perform.  Viewers [including cable] do not perform.’234”  With that, the 
Broadcasters exhausted their last chance at obtaining full victory—total copyright 
liability.   
51-100, and 3 networks plus 1 independent outside the top 100 markets.   See id. The rules also 
required a minimum 20 channel capacity.
229 See generally, Besen & Crandall, supra note 192, at 93-103.
230 U.S. Congress House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and 
the Administration for Justice Hearings, 92d Cong. (1972), in 14 Omnibus Copyright Revision 
Legislative History 667 (George S. Grossman ed., 1976)  (statement of George J. Barco).
231 Id.
232 Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
233 Id. at 400.
234 Id. at 403.
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Congress enacted the copyright side of the compromise in 1976.   The form 
was a compulsory licensing law, codified in § 111 of the 1976 Act.235   As a 
settlement, it on the one hand allowed the cable systems to continue their basic 
means of doing business:  retransmission of broadcast programs.   Yet in exchange 
cable systems agreed to pay royalties on imported signals,236 not to alter the content 
or advertising of the signals it retransmitted,237 and to retransmit programs 
simultaneously with the broadcast.238    In short, the licensing scheme mapped the 
existing business practices of cable companies, and added liabilities to it.   The 
extent of these liabilities was to be determined by a new statutory creation, the 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal.239
In the last stage of the 1970s settlement, the FCC repealed most of the 
remaining regulation of the cable industry.  By January 1, 1978, as the copyright 
system came into force, the core remaining limitations of the old regime remained 
the “distant-signal” limitations, which limited the import of programming into 
large (top 100) television markets,240 and the syndicated exclusivity rules, which
allowed local stations in urban areas to force cable to black-out programs for which 
they had purchased exclusive exhibition rights.241 Together, these two rules 
continued to limit cable’s exploitation of urban markets.    But in 1980, the FCC 
repealed these last regulations.242  It concluded that the absence of evidence of 
economic harm and the new copyright scheme had eliminated any need for its 
235 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1) (2000).
236 Id.
237 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(2).
238 17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1), (f) .
239 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-810 (1976).   The Tribunal was abolished in 1993 and its functions 
transferred to the Copyright Office and the Librarian of Congress.  See the Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304 (1993), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 803 
(2000).
240 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b)-(e), 76.61(b)-(f), 76.63 (1980).
241 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-76.161.
242 See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), aff’d 
sub nom Malrite Television v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981).
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copyright “surrogates.”243   With this decision, the replacement of prohibitive FCC 
regulations with copyright liability was essentially complete.244
Freed from regulatory limits, cable subscription exploded.  From 1975-1985 
subscription quadrupled.   The 3,506 systems serving nearly 10 million subscribers 
became by 1985 6,600 systems serving nearly 40 million Americans.245 It had taken
thirty years and much regulatory warfare.  But cable the succession was complete, 
and the cable industry assumed its place as the dominant technology of television.
d. Epilogue
As telecommunications historians know, the 1970s did not entirely end the 
regulatory battles between cable and broadcasting.   The copyright royalty tribunal, 
for example, attracted enormous litigation in its setting of fees.246 There emerged 
in the 1980s a movement (backed by broadcasters) to tame the power of cable, 
culiminating in Congress reinstating some of the regulations that the FCC had 
dropped in the late 1970s. For example, in 1992 Congress adopted the 
retransmission consent rule first proposed by the FCC in 1968, giving broadcasters, 
for the first time, a clear property right in their signals.247
Yet at this stage these conflicts were between mature industries, not incumbent 
and challenger.  The example of the 1992 retransmission consent rules shows the 
difference.  Had the courts granted broadcasters such rights in 1961 (as common-
law unfair competition rights), the rights would have put cable development in the 
243 Inquiry into the Economic Relationship between Television Broadcasting & Cable 
Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979).
244 Only the network non-duplication and must-carry rules remained in place. See Cable 
Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), aff’d sub nom Malrite 
Television v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981). 
245See Parsons & Frieden, supra note 222, 57-60 (detailing the cable “explosion” of the 
1980s); see also United States, Cable Television, available at 
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/U/htmlU/unitedstatesc/unitedstatesc.htm (detailing 
facts of cable’s growth).
246 See Register of Copyright, Compulsory Licensing in the Television Industry (1990).
247 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) § 2(a)(2)-(5) (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)-(5)) (detailing the 
increase in cable viewership).
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control of broadcasters.248   In 1992, things were much different.  Congress 
described the cable industry not as a pirate, but as the ”dominant nationwide video 
medium.”249  And when confronted with demands for further payment the cable 
networks asserted their power and refused to pay for retransmission consent.250
Cable’s stance made it clear: broadcast was now dependent on cable, and not vice 
versa.   Their roles had reversed.
E.   The Classic Communications Regime Arrives
The birth of the recording industry, radio broadcast and cable created a pattern 
for setting copyright’s communications policy.  It is centered on the model of access 
fees, or compulsory licenses.  New technologies capable of delivering copyrighted 
content will be granted access to the copyrighted works essential to their business, 
but for a price.   This basic model was followed for several subsequent matters, 
including satellite television in the 1980s,
251 and radio webcasting in the 1990s.
252
The model is therefore something of a default for industries do not fit the model of 
exemptions that are the “new” copyright communications regime described in Part 
III.
248 For a description of efforts to obtain a common-law right in signal, see supra, text 
accompanying notes 184-191.
249 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) § 2(a)(2)-(5).
250 See Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An Examination Of The 
Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. S 325(B)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED. COMM. L. J. 99, 
144-149 (1996) (noting that instead of cash, most broadcasters exchanged their retransmission 
consent for cable’s agreement to carry additional channels); Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the 
Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L. J. 1579, 1658-59 (2003) (same).
251 The Satellite Home Viewers Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3949 (Title II 
codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) created a compulsory license for satellite 
broadcasting similar in structure to the cable compulsory license.
252 Webcasters pay royalties for sound recordings according to a complicated scheme first 
made law in the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 
§ 1, 109 Stat. 336, 336 (1995).  For an overview of the political process that led to the compulsory 
license, see Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution Is Ready To Begin, As Soon As We 
Figure Out The Copyright Law: The Story Of The Music Industry At War With Itself, 24 HASTINGS 
COMM/ENT L.J. 1 (2001). 
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For copyright theorists, the history evolution of the classic regime holds 
important lessons.   However pure and true copyright’s goals of promoting
authorship may be, the law will nonetheless inevitably be used by communications 
companies  as a  powerful instrument of competitive advantage. Copyright cannot 
help but create create the baseline for competition among disseminators. It creates 
communications policy not by design but by necessity.
PART II: POLICY
I have suggested that copyright has evolved to regulate competition among 
rivals, that it in effect comprises independent authorship and communications 
regimes, and that the communications regime has evolved a standing institutional 
practice of using copyright to settle near-inevitable conflicts among rival 
disseminators.   These are descriptive claims.   The second part addresses the 
obvious policy questions that arise from study of copyright’s communications 
regime.  
A.  Bottlenecks and Vertical Foreclosure
The economic analysis of authorship revolves around the nonrivalrous nature
of information goods and the problems thereby created.  Copyright’s role in 
communications policy, conversely, is more readily analyzed as the “bottleneck” 
problem deriving from copyright’s grant of control over an asset essential to 
market entry (namely, copyrighted works), and the potential created for vertical 
foreclosure of rivals.
To understand what this means we must consider the conditions of competition 
that face rival disseminators regulated by copyright.   Consider a disseminator to 
be anyone who owns a legally protected means of communication with a customer:
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Fig. 3.1 Communications Model
In the field of communications, the legally protected link pictured here can take 
many forms.  It can be physical, protected by the rules of personal property:  
copper loops between the telephone company and the consumer, the cable 
infrastructure, and so on.  But the link can also be a legal entitlement that does not 
reference any particular physical infrastructure, such as the allocation of a certain 
spectrum frequency to a broadcaster to reach its customers.253 From this state of 
affairs arise a central and recurring policy questions.   To what degree should the 
legal protection afforded that bottleneck allow the original owner, or the 
incumbent disseminator from engaging in anti-competitive practices?   
There are two anti-competitive practices that are of particular interest and recur 
in the study of communications law.   The first is the simple problem of monopoly 
price-setting. 254  The incumbent should be expected to charge a supra-competitive 
price if its ownership of the protected link makes is the only entity in a position to 
provide the service in question.   In the telecommunications law this problem has 
traditionally led to extensive government rate-setting, such as the setting of local 
telephone rates.
255
The second is the problem of vertical foreclosure: the use of the protected link 
to prevent a competing disseminator, or challenger, who depends on the link, from 
253 See 47 U.S.C. § 307 (procedures for federal grants of licenses to broadcast spectrum).
254 Ingo Vogelsang and Bridger M. Mitchell, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION 55 (2001) 
(discussing the effect of bottlenecks on price-setting policy). 
255 See 1 HOWARD ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW §9.2 (1999) (describing 
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reaching the customer in question. 256 The foreclosure is “vertical” because the 
incumbent uses its control over an independent input at another level (copyrighted 
materials) to affect competion at the level of dissemination.
257
Fig. 3.2 Vertical Foreclosure via Bottleneck
An illustration of the vertical foreclosure problem comes from the example of 
long distance telephone service.   If the incumbent (Bell) owns the local telephone 
lines, it can potentially foreclose a long-distance service provider (MCI) from 
reaching any customers, favoring its own long distance service.   Hence a critical 
question for telecommunications law has always been determing the extent to 
which the owner of the local phone service should be required to provide access to 
local lines to vendors of long-distance telephone service.
258
256 There is a rich literature on vertical foreclosure in general, see, e.g., Janusz A. Ordover et 
al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Louis Kaplow, Extension 
of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985); Michael A. Salinger, 
Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 77 Q.J. ECON. 345 (1988); and as relates to 
telecommunications policy in particular, see, e.g., Alexander Larson et al., Competitive Access 
Issues and Telecommunications Regulatory Policy, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 419 (1994); Paul Joskow & 
Roger Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications In Telecommunications, Electricity, And Other Network 
Industries, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1249 (1999).  For an excellent overview of the economic arguments 
regarding vertical integration and their relevance for communications policy, see Phil Weiser & 
Joseph Farrell, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of 
Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. L. & TECH. 86 (2004). 
257 Whether copyrighted materials are described as upstream or downstream is largely a 
semantic issue.   The foreclosure is vertical in either case.
258 See 1 1 HOWARD ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW §9.1 (1999) 








Both of these problems stemming from the bottleneck are central to most 
contemporary communications policy:  wireline regulation, broadband regulation 
and spectrum policy are three present examples.259  In each case the basic problem 
is the same.   On the one hand, allowing the incumbent too much power to prevent 
challengers from reaching customers retards both price competition and (according 
to modern views) innovation in new communications technologies.   But granting 
too little legal protection to the original link might erase the incentives to build the 
original link and its technological successors.
With some simplifying assumptions, it is not hard to see how the copyright law 
can be used as a potential tool for monopoly price-setting or vertical foreclosure, 
raising the same questions faced in communications.260 The vertical foreclosure 
problem is evident from the story of broadcast and cable industries in the 1960s. 261
Each possessed its own technology for reaching consumers.  Yet each needed
access to copyrighted works in order to provide a service customers would pay for.   
The copyright works were the bottleneck necessary to compete in the industry.  
Hence, if broadcast (the incumbent) could enforce the copyrights in television
content, it could have prevented or foreclosed the cable industry from reaching 
television customers.  It can achieve similar results that the telephone industry 
might achieve by controlling local phone lines.
259 See id. at 51-59 (2001).
260 Cf. Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 
ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (2002).
261 See supra, Section I.G(1) 
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Fig. 3.3 Copyright used for Vertical Foreclosure 
The vertical foreclosure model, however, only describes one class of 
communications problem that arises in the copyright context.   The problems of 
monopoly price-setting can also occur.  This has happened in situations where 
authors maintain independent control of their copyrights, as in the ASCAP-Radio 
dispute described above.262 The communications model for the ASCAP problem is 
a horizontal cartel among the suppliers of copyrighted works (authors), leading to 
monopoly price-setting.   It is the necessity of having access to content, and the 
legal protection of copyright, that create the possibility for an ASCAP cartel in the 
first place.
Fig. 3.4 The Difference that Authorial Control Makes 
There is an important difference between the problems created by the 
horizontal (ASCAP) and vertical (broadcast) competition problems, respectively.   
While a horizontal cartel among authors may be expected to raise consumer prices, 












it will not necessarily block market entry of technological innovation.  For 
economic theories which take innovation as opposed to price-competition as the 
primary engine of economic growth,
263 the vertical foreclosure problem is more 
serious.
All of this goes to show that the copyright law’s protections can and do create 
the same competition problems regularly encountered in telecommunications law.  
None of this is to suggest that the best way of dealing with these problems is self-
evident.  There is sizable disagreement over what, if any, government role is 
appropriate in the face of potential vertical foreclosure or monopoly-price setting.
264
Yet over the years positions have hardened and it is easier to understand the 
choices available.   What follows describes the policy alternatives that have 
emerged.
B.   National Communications Policy
To understand the choices faced in copyright we must now turn to the subject 
of national communications policy.   There have long existed two basic models of 
the optimal communications policy, which may be usefully called the 
“stewardship” and “competitive” or “open” models.265   Both models have a 
pedigree in national communications policy, though the latter is today dominant.   
1.  Stewardship Communications Policy
A steward-based communications policy266 is premised on the grant, to private 
parties, of clear and uncontestable property entitlements in future media and 
263 See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (3d ed. 
1950).
264 For a useful normative overview of when governmental intervention may be justified to 
prevent vertical integration, see Weiser & Farell, supra n. 256.
265 For another description of these two models in the internet context, see Philip J. Weiser, 
The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 568-583 (2003). 
266 Advocates will sometimes describe this as a “deregulatory” communications policy, 
though this language is difficult to support when it is copyright system, a form of regulation, 
that is conferring the right to block or license market entry.  See Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as 
Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright in a Digital World, 79 OR. L. REV. 647, 694-95 
(2000).
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technologies.   The rationale for such grants is the premise that the private owner of 
such a grant will, in the interest of profit maximization, efficiently steward the 
growth of an efficient communications system and the development new 
technologies.267
 The stewardship model has historically enjoyed many arguments in its favor, 
including support from economist Joseph Schumpeter.
268   Chief among them is the 
view that the dominant firm can be expected to internalize what would otherwise 
be externalities in a competitive scenario.  For example, competitors may have 
incentives to free-ride on the research efforts of others, while a dominant 
incumbent has no such option.  Similarly, a dominant incumbent may exercise 
quality control to prevent shoddy products from being used on its system.269
The problem of natural monopoly also drives the argument for a steward-based 
communications policy.  Economists have argued that economies of scale and 
scope characterizing the production of telecommunications services makes a 
monopoly the likely outcome.270   If a monopoly is an inevitability in 
communications markets, a policy that directs the monopolist to secure innovation 
and act in the public interest may seem the only recourse.
Relatedly, a steward-based communications policy also avoids much arguably 
wasteful duplication.  The dominant market player can avoid duplicative 
investments for the transmission of the same information to the same consumer 
(such a two sets of telephone lines, or two different printings of the same book).   
This is the argument for allowing communications infrastructures to take the form 
of natural monopolies.  And as pertains to technological innovation, the dominant 
267 This stewardship model is similar to the “prospect theory” of patent protection.  See
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
268 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 100-06 (3d ed., 
1950)
269 Cf. Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 615 (2000) (arguing that intellectual property law should encourage price coordination in 
emerging technology contexts).
270 See Ingo Vogelsang & Bridger Mitchell, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION 51 (1997) 
(descring natural monopoly as the justification for telecommunications regulation.)
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art5Copyright’s Communications Policy
65
player can prevent duplicative “races” to reach the same invention, much like 
preventing multiple missions to pursue the same sunken treasure.271
As a model of innovation, the planned view shares much with the “prospect 
theory” in patent law, which holds that control centralized in a pioneer industry 
allows a more orderly process of follow-on innovation.272  The costs of conflict, or 
“rent dissipation,” may be eliminated if broad, enforceable rights are granted to the 
pioneer industry, creating a prospect that can be explored without fear of 
competition.   
Finally, the greatest appeal for many is the fact that the Stewardship model 
implies a much simpler (though not necessarily reduced) governmental role.   The 
Government need only to assign and to enforce property rights, but it need not 
decide whether its grants of property rights are improperly blocking market entry.   
The incumbent industry does so itself.
In short, the vision of the Steward model relies on a distrust of Government in 
favor of the developmental wisdom an incumbent communications industry.    The 
model claims simplicity, efficiency and limited role for the State.
2. “Competitive” Communications Policy
A “competitive” or “open” communications policy sacrifices order, 
predictability and stability of a planned policy for greater allowance of market 
entry and (backers believe) faster technological development.273
Competitive or open communications policies are premised on the belief that 
technical innovation plays a central role in economic growth, and that technical 
change is best understood as an evolutionary process.   The ideas also claim their 
origins in Joseph Shumpeter’s work: but in his conception that “creative 
destruction” is the source of capitalism’s benefits, not mere price competition.274
271 Cf. Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 69, at 35-38 (examining rent 
dissipation theory by analyzing costs through example of hunt for a sunken treasure).
272 See Kitch, supra note 267.
273 See Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 961 (2001).
274 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-86 (3d ed. 
1950).
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Economists like Richard Nelson argue that technological change is by necessity an 
error-driven, evolutionary process.275   Markets select from a variety of competing 
approaches whose relative merit, crucially, is difficult to assess in advance.276
This view leads to distrust of the stewardship model and dominant firm 
theories.  If the most promising path of development is difficult to predict in 
advance, Nelsonites argue, it unrealistic to expect a single company to take the 
optimal path of technological development, however well intentioned it may be.  
This problem is compounded if any single party can be expected to have anything 
less than perfect decision-making skills resulting from, for example, a 
predisposition to continue with current ways doing business.277  Legal theorists on 
similar lines argue that vesting control over improvement in a single figure creates 
an enormous risk of stagnancy deriving from the danger of incumbent industry’s 
uninterest in change.278
The competitive model usually suggests to a more active Government role, 
particularly in removing barriers to market entry.  In this model the government is 
pictured (ideally) as something like a beneficent gardener, trying to preserve 
conditions for innovation and prevent a dominant firm from choking new growth.  
For if innovation does indeed occur the way Nelsonites believe, greater 
government involvement may be necessary to prevent industrial and technological 
stagnation.
 3. The Consensus Position
275 See, e.g., Richard Nelson, Understanding Technical Change as an Evolutionary Process 14 –21 
(1987); John Ziman, Evolutionary Models for Technological Change, in TECHNOLOGICAL 
INNOVATION AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 3 (John Ziman, ed., 2000).
276 See Nelson, supra note 275, at 15 (evolutionary theory recognizes that “there are 
stochastic [random] elements both in the determination of decisions and of decision 
outcomes.”).
277 See Nelson, supra note 275, at 72-95 (discussing the concept of organizational “skills.”).
278 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 890-94 (1990) (criticizing stewardship model in the patent 
context).  This is also an animating principle of Lawrence Lessig’s work, particularly THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS (2000).
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Whatever the substative merits of these two approaches to communications 
policy, as a descriptive matter, some version of the “competitive model” has 
dominated national communications policy since the mid-1980s.279   It is true that 
there remains much disagreement on how competition is best promoted, and in 
particular how intrusive a role government should play.   Yet it is to the model of 
competitive innovation that both the Federal Communications Commission and 
Congress now uniformly adhere to.
Things were not always so tipped in favor of the competitive model.  The 
balance of 20th century communications policy was driven, instead, by a 
stewardship model, a model most clearly apparent in the Bell System’s 
stewardship of the national telephone system.  The Bell Company is the definitive 
model of the regulated monopolist asked to implement the public policy 
aspirations of national communications policy.280   Yet from the late 1960s onward, 
the courts, Federal Communications Commission and finally Congress began a 
slow migration to the competitive communications model now dominant.   Glen 
Robinson describes the 30-year shift as “one of the stunning achievements of 
modern public policy, the transformation of a staid and stagnant industry into the 
most dynamic and rapidly growing industry in the modern economy.”281   As he 
argues, it “did not come about through technology alone; it came about by 
rethinking notions about natural monopoly, economies of scale and scope--
concepts near and dear to the ancient regime.”282
There are many legal milestones in the policy migration. The most notable and 
dramatic was the 1984 breakup of the AT&T monopoly by federal judge Harold 
Green.283  But the clearest legislative manifestation of this policy shift is the 1996 
279 See, e.g., GERALD W. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION AGE 
(1994); Glen O. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: AT&T and the Changing World of 
Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. REG. 517, 520-31 (1988) (recounting history of telecommunications 
policy).
280 See Glen Robinson, supra note 279, at 517 (1988) (describing the Bell System). 
281 Glen Robinson, The New Communications Act:  A Second Opinion, 29 CONN. L. REV. 289, 
304 (1996).
282 Id.
283 The breakup of AT&T is recounted in detail in GERALD R. FAULHABER 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TURMOIL: TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1988).
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Telecom Act, the central statute of communications law.284  As the Federal 
Communications Commission explains, the law was meant to “let any 
communications business compete in any market against any other.”285   While the 
Act is far too complicated to summarize, its most important and best known 
change was the authorization of open competition in both local and long-distance 
telephone services.286   These changes were a sharp break from previous policies, 
which still adhered to the Bell model.  And while assessments of the success of 
1996 Act’s promotion of competition is mixed,287 its policy is clear.
Stated adherence to the competitive model of communications policy is now de 
riguer for the Federal Communications Commission.   Across every area of stated 
policy, the FCC states goals that could have been drafted by Richard Nelson.   The 
competitive goal of the FCC is to “support the Nation’s economy by ensuring that 
there is a comprehensive and sound competitive framework for communications 
services …  foster[ing] innovation and offer[ing] consumers meaningful choice in 
services.”   In the contentious area of broadband, the FCC aims to “establish 
regulatory policies that promote competition, innovation, and investment in 
broadband service.”   Or as Commission Chairman Michael Powell puts it, the FCC
must do what is necessary to foster “competitive innovation.”288
Much of this, of course, is at a certain level of abstraction, and there is much 
debate over what policies will, in fact, facilitate competitive innovative in the 
communications industry.   But in the areas of communications law outside of
284 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in 
scattered portions of 47 U.S.C.).
285 See Federal Communications Commission, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, at 
http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html (last updated Nov. 13, 2001).
286 See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
287 The Act’s effort to create more local telephone competition is widely described as a 
“failure.”  See, e.g., However, it is credited by some for opening up the market for 
telecommunications services more generally.  See, e.g, Corey Grice, How the Telecom Act created a 
new breed of speed, CNET News, at http://news.com.com/2009-1033_3-251796.html (Feb. 1, 
2001) (arguing that the 1996 Act set off the expansion and development of broadband internet 
access).
288 Remarks of Michael K. Powell at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium on
“The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age” 
University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, Colorado, February 8, 2004.
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copyright law, the existence of a basic consensus is notable.   The starting point for 
debate is the view that open communications competition drives innovation and 
economic growth.  The question is what role the copyright law plays in that vision.
C.  Copyright’s Classic Communications Policy
How can copyright’s classic communications policy best be described in terms 
of the models described here?   Copyright’s record is, of course, complicated and 
inconsistent.   There are also too few examples to come to a definite conclusion.  
Yet it is notable that, when faced with the potential of problem of vertical 
foreclosure—copyright creating bars to market entry by disseminators, copyright’s 
rules have often bent to prevent an incumbent from using copyright to control a 
technological challenger.  Stated otherwise, the courts and Congress have in 
practice avoided a stewardship model of communications and delivered results 
closer to a competitive model of communications policy.
As the history explained above demonstrates, the copyright system, when faced 
with major examples potential lockout, avoided granting dissemination 
incumbents full control over a technologically advanced rival (the same holds also 
for cases not recounted above).289   Instead, both the incumbent and the challenger 
were forced to put their case to government and to invest in efforts to steer policy 
in their favored direction.  
  Obviously things could have been different.   With just a few decisions the 
Supreme Court could have easily steered matters toward the stewardship model, 
trusting the incumbent to direct future development of cable, the recording 
industry, or the photocopier.  As Jane Ginsburg has argued, many of the pro-
challenger Supreme Court decisions, from White-Smith to Fortnightly, can be 
impossible to understand without some idea that the Court feared that the 
289 The other major example is that of the  photocopier, which was exempted from 
copyright protection in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an 
equally divided Supreme Court, 420 U.S. 375 (1975).  For a wonderful recount of the 
photocopier saga, see Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (1994).
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incumbent wanted copyright for the wrong reasons.290  Similarly, the most 
common statutory form of settlement, the compulsory license, is a liability scheme 
that prevents market lockout while compensating the incumbent.  Such a scheme, 
as discussed above, is inconsistent with a steward model of communications 
policy.
Even though the classic communications regime mainly reflected an open 
model of communications policy, it must be admitted that no self-conscious 
reasoning can be found to that effect in the caselaw or in other sources.  The main 
communications cases, like Teleprompter, are almost entirely free of any policy-
based explanations for the courts’ decisions.   Can we find some underlying 
statutory compulsion or case that drove copyright to such an open policy?
One important factor that may have driven copyright’s early communications 
policy and the liability rules it created was the media-specific nature of early 
copyright.   The early Acts, including the 1909 Act, specifically named the materials 
which could be protected by copyright.   This created a certain statutory 
uncertainty surrounding copyright’s application to new technologies and 
consequently left opportunities for parties to influence the final outcome.   While 
often decried as poor drafting, it is a classic historical example of an anomaly that 
became a feature.
Stated otherwise, the only reason that questions of application to new 
technologies were ever open for courts or Congress to decide was because the early 
copyright acts, based on the Statute of Anne, specifically enumerated materials in 
which copyright adhered.  Famously, the Copyright Act of 1790 protected “maps, 
charts, book or books.”291 The 1909 Act used the same format, but contained ten 
categories (books, lectures, musical compositions, etc.) of copyrightable works.   
When a new work fell outside of these categories, parties on each side were forced 
to present their case to government entities to decide what to do.   The result was to 
290 See Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 1617 (“when copyright owners seek to eliminate a new 
kind of dissemination, and when courts do not deem that dissemination harmful to copyright 
owners, courts decline to find infringement, even though the legal and economic analyses that 
support those determinations often seem strained, not to say disingenuous.”).
291 See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1,  1 Stat. 12, 124 (repealed 1831).
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force a case-by-case adoption of a communications policy.  Courts had the legal 
room to decide things in a way that left open the option of denying an incumbent 
control over new media.  The result was Copyright’s classic communications 
policy.
D. Understanding the Critiques of the Classic Communications Regime
With this framework of analysis is mind, we are in a better position to 
understand the criticism of what I have termed Copyright’s classic 
communications regime.   The practice from 1900-1976 has never been terribly 
popular.  Both contemporary and present copyright commentators have attacked 
its operation for a range of reasons—most of which, I argue, miss the point.   While 
there are reasons to disfavor the competitive model of communications policy, it 
seems rare that critics of the process actually make them.
As early as 1903 the Copyright Office began to argue that a revised Copyright 
statute should be flexible enough to deal with new technologies as they arose.   The 
Office argued in its report that “[copyright] ought to be dealt with as a whole, and 
not by further merely partial or temporizing amendments.”292 It stated that the 
“acts now in force should be replaced by one consistent statute, of simple and 
direct phraseology.”293  With greater force and effect in 1961, the Office argued for 
a copyright law that would be “broad enough to include not only those forms in 
which copyrightable works are now being produced, but also new forms which are 
invented or come into use later.”294  These are very common arguments.   Many 
copyright thinkers argue that the 1909 Act and other early acts were too clumsy, 
requiring amendment or difficult judicial interpretation for each new technology.
The problem with this critique is that it is seemingly rooted in interests
involving certainty and legal aesthetics (a simple statute) more than those 
involving the consequences of the rule for competition.   It is true that § 5 of 1909 
292 See Thorvald Soldberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 YALE L. J. 48, 62 (1925) (reprinting 
Copyright Report, Dec. 1 (1903)).
293 Id.
294 Staff of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Report of the Register of 
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 11 (Comm. Print 1961).
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Act produced uncertainty as to the rights of a copyright owner.  But such 
uncertainty can be part of a kind of communications policy that favors new entry.  
A simpler and clearer law is not a trump; the value of clarity must be weighed such 
larger concerns.  Perhaps implicit in the argument is also a kind of public choice 
concern:  the problem with statutory ambiguity is that it has encouraged parties to 
invest in efforts to gain favorable government action.   That is true, but it is also 
true that forcing parties to come to Government could have forced both sides to 
present information that may have led to better and earlier settlements.295
Some academics have criticized the classic model and its tendency toward 
compulsory licensing on different economic grounds.  Robert Merges has argued 
that enforcing property entitlements is more likely to promote the private 
bargaining necessary for creation of “collective rights organizations.”296  The value 
of collective rights organizations, according to Merges, is that they are better than 
compulsory licensing schemes for reducing the transaction costs of licensing a 
diverse mixture of copyrights.   Merges argues that policy makers should in all 
cases “stay away from compulsory licensing for new media!”297
Merges, in colloboration with Richard Nelson, has criticized the stewardship 
model of innovation in the patent context,298 so his position with respect to 
copyright is slightly surprising.   Merges takes the only purpose of compulsory 
licensing schemes to be the reduction of transaction costs—he does not account for 
the role a liability regime might play in market entry of new technologies.   The 
earlier Merges teaches that intellectual property’s “social costs should include its 
potential to reduce competition in the market for improvements” and “there are 
many instances when a firm that thought it had control over a broad technology 
rested on its laurels until jogged to action by an outside threat.”299  If this is so with 
respect to patent holders, why don’t the same considerations drive scrutiny of 
295 Cf. Ian Ayres & and Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1036-72 (1995).
296 See Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:  Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
297 See id. at 1300.
298 See Merges & Nelson, supra note 278.
299 Id. at 843,  872.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art5Copyright’s Communications Policy
73
copyright? In addition, Merges’ relies on ASCAP as an alternative model to 
compulsory licensing, but the analogy is inapposite, for several reasons.
ASCAP is a coalition of authors.   As a model it is therefore no answer for the 
problems created when rival disseminators use copyright against a rival.   As long as 
the disseminator in a given industry has effective control or actual ownership of 
copyright necessary to its business model, the ASCAP model is not a viable 
alternative.   The compulsory licensing regimes which Merges opposes are (as 
Section II.A points out), solutions to a different problem: vertical foreclosure of one 
disseminator by another.   The ASCAP model is only viable where authors have
sufficient independent power and control over their own copyrights.  As for the 
subject of pricing, the fact that ASCAP’s independent pricing scheme in under the 
shadow of an antitrust decree renders questionable the argument that ASCAP’s 
pricing is fully independent of government supervision.300
A final argument against the compulsory licensing model rests of the 
proposition that broad property entitlements are attractive because they will speed 
technological development. As Peter Huber, John Thorne and Michael Kellog 
stated in their 1995 treatise, granting broadcasters immediate rights over cable 
would have hastened its development:
It is interesting to speculate how differently things might have developed if the 
Supreme Court had affirmed both cable’s copyright obligations and its First 
Amendment rights simply and clearly at the outset … Without a right to pull 
signals from the air, cable might have started up more slowly, but it would 
have probably grown more quickly.301
Huber and his compatriots are proposing the Stewardship model of 
communications policy.   Their belief is that simple, clear and broad entitlements, 
unfettered by any regulation, will lead to the optimal deployment and 
development of communications technologies.   
As discussed above, the wisdom of such an approach must take into account 
the objections stemming from evolutionary theories of innovation.   This point can 
300 See United States v. ASCAP, 1950 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 62,595 at 63,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
301 See John Thorne et al., FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW § 10.11 (1995).
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be expressed in terms of the bottleneck problem described above.  For any form of 
expressive work (video, book, music, etc.) there will exist several potential 
technologies of dissemination.   Yet not every method of dissemination is invented 
at the same time, and indeed many cannot be predicted ex ante.  For example, the 
pioneering system of mass television dissemination was terrestrial broadcast—
rabbit ear antennas and tall towers.  In time various successive technologies of 
mass video dissemination were developed and reduced to practice, including wire 
(cable television), satellite, and most recently, streaming applications on the 
Internet.   
From these conditions we can see that granting a copyright entitlement that 
covers all forms of dissemination will have the effect of giving the pioneer industry 
the power to control the follow-on development of technology.  Assuming that the 
pioneer controls the creation of content (either by controlling copyrights, vertical 
integration, or through simple economic dependence), it can dictate what happens 
and what does not.   In the example of broadcast, if copyright in programming had 
clearly included future technologies like cable and satellite transmission, the 
decision to allow these dissemination technologies to develop would have rested 
with the broadcast industry.302   Everything then depends on whether policy-
makers believe that an incumbent can be trusted to promote, rather than to destroy, 
its technological rivals.
There are, finally, a second set of reasons to question the model of broad initial 
entitlements.   The model of broad initial rights can only yield the claimed benefits 
when such rights can be enforced.   For example copyright was generally seen as 
unenforceable against casual home copying in the 1970s and early 1980s.303   While 
this point is complicated by improved technologies of copy protection, so long as 
there exist rights that would be extremely expensive to enforce, the model of broad 
initial grants cannot be a complete answer.
302 Accord, Trotter Hardy, Copyright and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 657 (1999) 
(discussing new-use technology royalty obligations using “type-I” and “type-II” error 
methodology).
303 See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
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In short, while there is much automatic support for a “flexible” or “future-
proof” copyright, there seems less consideration of whether such a law would be 
good for innovation.   The argument, however, can be made, and Peter Huber 
comes closest to making it.   But while not conclusive, much recent economic 
thinking and even mainstream communications policy casts doubt on a model that 
grants the incumbent control over future inventions.  
E.   Author-Driven Communications Policy?
The analysis in this Part should make one thing clear:  who owns or controls the 
relevant copyrights in an industry sets the nature of the competition and 
communications problems created.   Authorial control of copyrights (as in the case 
of ASCAP) wi ll lea d to potential pricing problems, but is less likely to lead to
problem of vertical technological foreclosure.   Conversely, it is when an incumbent 
disseminator owns or has effective control over copyright that the potential for 
more troubling efforts to foreclose technological rivals emerges.
This analysis makes the possibility of author-driven dissemination attractive.
As a policy it would support broad and clear rights in authors, as authors should 
want maximum exposure for their work, regardless of dissemination media.   And 
if an author decided not to release her works using a given technology (say, film), 
then we might expect this to reflect artistic, rather than anti-competitive, concerns.   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the concept has been a long-time aspiration of the 
copyright law: the hope that authors would one-day become masters of their own 
destiny.304  In its latest form, the idea is that the emergence of digital media and the 
Internet may make authors the relevant actors for copyright’s communications 
policy.  Jane Ginsburg’s words describe this school of thought: “I suggest that 
digital media, by making the means of production and dissemination available to 
any computer-equipped author, gives authors a realistic opportunity to bring their 
works to the public without having to put themselves in thrall to traditional 
304 See, e.g., LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (1968) (“Not 
until after the Statute of Anne did the modern idea of copyright as a right of the author 
develop.”); see generally, JOSEPH LOWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR’S DUE: PRINTING AND THE 
PREHISTORY OF COPYRIGHT (2002).
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intermediaries.“305 A grant of greater authorial rights through copyright, according 
to Ginsburg, “not only enhances the moral appeal of the exercise of copyright, but 
also may offer the public an increased quantity and variety of works of 
authorship.”306
If authorial control over copyrights could help control some of the most 
troubling anti-competitive consequences of copyright, how achievable is that 
vision?  The problem remains what it always has been.   Despite the fact that 
authors who are not employees nominally own copyrights upon creation, they 
rarely control copyrights.   Most copyrights are contractually assigned to 
disseminators, owned by the employer through the work-for-hire doctrine, or 
otherwise effectively controlled by the disseminator.307 It is a function of the 
relative bargaining power of authors and disseminators.  Unless this difference in 
power or the laws controlling copyright contracting changes, true authorial control 
of copyright will likely remain an attractive vision but not a discernable reality.
Might, as Ginsburg suggests, digital dissemination technologies change things, 
and strengthen the relative power of authors?   While the question is factual there 
are reasons to suspect that development like the internet or indeed any 
technologies are unlikely to eliminate the central role of disseminators and other 
intermediaries, and their continued control over copyright.
It is, first of all, hard to get rid of intermediaries for a reason, one having 
nothing to do with law or technology, but instead for reasons stemming from the 
305 Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 1646.   
306 Id.   Paul Goldstein’s vision of a “celestial jukebox” that stores all copyright works and 
makes them available on demand is also an author-driven vision.  He writes “by charging 
subscribers electronically for each use of the prerecorded works it offers -- motion pictures, 
sound recordings, books, magazines or newspaper articles -- the celestial jukebox will be able to 
compensate copyright owners each time their works are chosen.” See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY 30 (1994).
307 See, e.g, ALBERT N. GRECO, THE BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 152-55 (1997) (sample of 
typical publishing contract assigning copyright to publisher); Bruce H. Phillips & Carl R. 
Moore, Digital Performance Royalties:  Should Radio Pay?, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. &PRAC. 169, n. 28 




basic theory of comparative advantage.308  Specialized intermediaries exist, after 
all, because they specialize in doing things that people don’t necessarily do well 
themselves.    Carpenters specialize in making furniture; while it is possible for 
people to make their own furniture, it comes at great tangible and opportunity 
cost.
The logic of specialization carries over to the world of packaged information 
and suggests a continuing role for specialized disseminators. Authors, after
constructing their own furniture, could also serve as their own publishers and 
publicists.  But the author who does so will usually be at disadvantage compared 
to one who collaborates with someone else, particularly someone like a publisher, 
who specializes in publication and publicity.  Changes in technology haven’t 
changed that basic dynamic, even though today’s intermediaries have changed.  
While we are only a decade into the universalization of the Internet, there is 
only limited evidence that it has eliminated the control that disseminators have 
over copyrights.   There are a few examples of authors—often famous and rich—
who have temporarily become their own disseminators.  Stephan King, for 
example, famously distributed one of his books directly to his fans.309   Rapper Ice 
T decided to distribute one of his albums, for $4.99 per copy, via the online 
distribution service KaZaA.310 Yet these are the exceptions.  Even the Beatles –
who founded Apple Records to try and give artists more power over their work311 -
- have many of their sound recording copyrights controlled by publisher EMI.  
That company has used its ownership of the Beatles copyrights to prevent 
308 The seminal statement of the theory of comparative advantage is found in David 
Ricardo, see David Ricardo, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1963)..   The 
point with regards to online activities is developed further in JACK GOLDSMITH & TIMOTHY WU, 
THE RETURN OF THE LEVIATHAN, Chapter 4 (Manuscript on file with author).
309 See “Stephen King offers online thrills,” SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 24, 2000, at A5. 
310 See “Ice T offers album for sale to music-swap site users,” USA TODAY, April 10, 2003.
311 See generally, BRUCE SPIZER, THE BEATLES ON APPLE RECORDS (2003) (describing reasons 
for the founding of Apple Records).
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unauthorized remixing in rap songs, when it is not clear whether the Beatles 
themselves would have cared.312
In short, in spite of centuries of good intentions, the goal of moving actual as 
opposed to notional control over copyright to authors remains unachieved.  It 
remains for many an aspiration of copyright policy, and a communications analysis 
suggests the aspiration has independent economic justifications.  But in the 
meantime, copyright theorists must continue to analyze a world in which various 
disseminators are the effective owners of copyright.   This fact makes copyright’s 
role in communications policy more, not less, important.
PART III:  COPYRIGHT’S NEW COMMUNICATIONS POLICY
The main point of this Article has been to describe copyright’s communications 
regime and to explain the choices it has been making.   Up until this point we have 
focused on the classic communications regime, centered on compulsory licensing 
regime.   Since the 1976 Act the legal operation of copyright’s communications 
policy has shifted in important ways, though the policy questions remain the same.   
While the pattern of congressional settlement remains, a new pattern of judicial 
immunities, under the doctrines of contributory liability and fair use, that 
constitute copyright’s new communications policy. 
A.   The Communications Policy of the 1976 Act
The 1976 Act marked an effort to try and to solve many of copyright’s 
perceived communications problems once and for all.  A key portion of the 1976 
Act was the § 102 specification that copyright would subsist in “original works of 
authorship fixed in any  tangible medium of expression,  now known or later developed 
….”313  As the House Report explained, “This broad language is intended to avoid 
the artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as 
White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. … Under the bill it makes no difference 
312 Noah Shachtman, “Copyright Enters a Grey Area,” WIRED NEWS, Feb 14, 2004, available 
at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62276,00.html
313 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (emphasis added).  
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what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be.”314  As the Copyright Office 
had argued, the 1909 Act compounded the constant conflict surrounding the 
arrival of new technologies.  One hope was that the 1976 Act could solve this 
“problem.”
But as this Article has argued, conflicts among communications rivals are 
likely to be inevitable as long as new technologies are invented that give 
challengers the opportunity to undercut incumbents.315   It should therefore be no 
surprise that the 1976 Act failed to end the pattern of conflict that characterizes
copyright’s history.   Some of the challenges, such as satellite, and webcasting, have 
followed the classic pattern of copyright settlement centered on a compulsory 
license.   The principle examples are the Satellite compulsory license (1988), and the 
Webcasting compulsory license (1995).   Notably, both of these post-1976 
settlements have resulted in terms less favorable to the challenger, possibly because 
the comprehensive nature of the 1976 Act weakened their initial position.
Yet since the 1976 Act a new type of technological challenger has emerged, and 
with it a different type of copyright accommodation.   Under the 1909 Act, 
technologies like radio and cable operated openly because their status under 
copyright was unclear.   Post-1976 challengers have relied on a different loophole 
in the copyright scheme: its difficulty with enforcement against individual 
infringers. 316   And the result is copyright’s new communications regime, centered 
not on compulsory licenses, but on judicially granted immunities from copyright 
liability.    The foundation of this new system is the Sony case, and it is to that 
conflict that we now turn.
B. Sony-driven Communications Policy
In November 1975, Sony Japan began selling its first consumer version of the 
“Video Tape Recorder” based on Betamax technology.  Selling for the suggested 
retail price of $2295, the floor model LV-1901 combined a 19” color television with 
314 H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess, at 52 (1994).
315 See supra text accompanying notes 60 to 79 and accompanying text.
316 Until recently, enforcement against individuals was extremely rare, to a degree that one 
might say it was not a part of copyright.  The evolution of copyright’s enforcement system is 
described in Wu, supra note 66, at 685-686.
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a VCR capable of storing a full hour of television programming on a single cassette.   
The advertisement that began the VCR conflict ran as follows:
NOW YOU DON’T HAVE TO MISS KOJAK BECAUSE YOU’RE 
WATCHING COLUMBO (OR VICE VERSA)
BETAMAX—IT’S A SONY317
With this advertisement, “time-shifting,” or recording programs to watch later,
entered the public imagination.   But the film industry was not impressed.  Within 
a year, on November 11, 1976, Universal Studios and Walt Disney filed complaints 
of copyright infringement.318
The familiar pattern of copyright conflict was set.  Sony and other electronics 
manufacturers were challengers offering a new and better way to watch broadcast 
content.   Part of their market advantage, of course, came from not having to pay 
anything for copyright licenses to films and television programs.   Meanwhile, 
movie studios displayed little interest in promoting VCR technology, and much 
more interest in either trying to stop the VCR in its tracks or obtaining royalties.  
Both sides, as usual, went to the federal government.  
Jack Valenti stated the film industry’s case in Congressional hearings.  The 
VCR, he opined, “exists for one purpose in life … to copy copyrighted material that 
belongs to other people.” 319  But, Mr. Valenti warned, “Nothing of value is free. It 
is very easy, Mr. Chairman, to convince people that it is in their best interest to give 
away somebody else's property for nothing, but even the most guileless among us 
know that this is a cave of illusion where commonsense is lured and then quietly 
strangled.”320
317 Reprinted in JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD:  HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE 
ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 21 (1987).
318 Id. at 34.
319 Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R. 4808, 
H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 97th Cong, 2d Sess. 6 (1982) 




In addition to blaming Japanese VCRs for the American trade deficit, Valenti 
expressed a candid view of copyright as a form of protection for the film industry:
“We [the film industry] are facing a very new and a very troubling assault on 
our fiscal security, on our very economic life and we are facing it from a thing 
called the video cassette recorder and its necessary companion called the blank 
tape. And it is like a great tidal wave just off the shore. This video cassette 
recorder and the blank tape threaten profoundly the life-sustaining protection, I 
guess you would call it, on which copyright owners depend, on which film 
people depend, on which television people depend and it is called copyright.  
… I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the American 
public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home alone.”321
By 1981 the film industry had convinced the Ninth Circuit to hold Sony liable 
for contributing to the copyright infringement of home viewers.322  That court 
found that the videotape recorder had no purpose other to infringe:  it was 
“manufactured, advertised, and sold for the primary purpose of reproducing 
[copyrighted] television programming.”323  Since the court could find no exception 
in the copyright code for personal or home copying, Sony was infringing.  The 
court suggested either placing a permanent injunction on the sale of the VCR or 
setting up a royalty scheme:  a judicial version of a compulsory license.
Within 24 hours of the decision, both sides went to Congress with different 
proposals.  The electronics industry wanted a full exemption from copyright 
liability for home video recording.324  The film industry counter-offered with an 
exemption tied to a royalty scheme for the fim and television industries.325   It 
seemed that the VCR matter would follow the pattern of the classic 
communications regime, and end in a Congressionally-implemented settlement.
321 Id. at 8.
322 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
323 See id. at 975.
324 See  S. 175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG.REC. S668 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983); see also 
H.R. 5250, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG.REC. H2241 (daily ed. May 13, 1982); H.R. 4783, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
325 See S. 31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG.REC. S255 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983); H.R. 1030, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 5705, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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But the Supreme Court upstaged Congress with its first major copyright 
communications policy case since Fortnightly.  In Sony the Court, as is well known, 
sided with the electronics industry, delivering the exemption from copyright they 
were seeking in Congress.  The Court did so by holding that the VCR would be 
exempt from contributory or vicarious copyright liability provided that its 
technologies were, in fact, technologies of general or broad purpose.326  As Justice 
Stevens stated in his oft-cited Sony rule, “the sale of copying equipment, like the 
sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if 
the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.”327  To put the 
matter further: “Indeed it [the technology] need merely be capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses.”328
Sony is acclaimed for its foresight:  in retrospect, the VCR and the DVD did 
much for the film industry. As Edward Samuels states, “the VCR turned out to be 
one of the most lucrative inventions—for movie producers, as well as hardware 
manufacturers—since movie projectors.” 329  Unlike the other major copyright 
communications cases, Sony did not lead to the formal establishment of a liability 
regime.  As detailed by writer James Lardner, the film industry opted for a softer 
line, and slowly began to reject the popular view that the industry needed to
“squelch” the VCR.330   And in time the VCR became a major source of revenue for 
the film and broadcast industries, so a liability regime would have been one 
without damages.331
One reason Sony may have succeeded analytically is that it self-consciously 
abandoned a simple authorship analysis when faced with the use of copyright by 
an incumbent industry to control or block legitimate technological rivals.332  Indeed 
the Sony rule can be understood as a rule to help a court distinguish between 
326 The court also ruled time-shifting a “fair use.”  See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (“[T]he 
unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' programs is legitimate fair use.”).
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Edward Samuels, THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 70 (2000).
330 Lardner, supra n. 317, at 284.
331 See id. at 325-328 (detailing how videocassette revenue grew to equal that of ticket 
revenue).
332 See Sony, 464 U.S. 417.
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problems of authorship and the more difficult problems of competition among 
disseminators.   The fact that a new communications technology can be used for 
“legitimate, unobjectionable purposes” establishes that the court is faced with a 
market entrant, as opposed to mere evasion of the copyright statute.  Hence the 
Court knows that it faces a problem of regulating competition among rivals, and 
act accordingly.  Conversely, if the technology in question is used merely to 
infringe, the Court is faced a problem where protecting authorship incentives
predominates.   This division is suggested by the Court’s statement that “Sound 
policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when 
major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. 
Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to 
accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are 
inevitably implicated by such new technology.”333
There is an important difference between the Sony rule and the unanchored 
“free pass” for new technologies in cases like Teleprompter. Sony forces federal 
courts to pass judgment on new technologies, to act as a kind of technological 
gatekeeper.  The court must make some assessment of whether, on balance, the 
likely harm created by the subject technology—most obviously, through damage to 
creation incentives—actually makes market entry desirable.   The Sony rule 
therefore requires courts to develop some concept of “legitimate” technology that 
is consistutes bonafide market entrant.  Its suggestion is very-open ended: being 
“capable of substantial noninfringing uses” is good enough.
The Sony rule puts courts in an odd position, for they must rely on their 
instincts and the limited evidence before them to decide whether a new technology 
seems legitimate.  The fact that so many now-mainstream communications 
technologies were born as pirates further complicates matters.   These limits of 
judicial ability might suggest a lenient reading of the Sony rule, but  some of c ome 
to the opposite conclusion. Randy Picker sees Sony as a rule of entry, sees the Sony 
rule as too lenient. In his view, Sony rule by its own logic allows harmful market 
entry: it would allow market entry of product that had $100 of legitimate use, but 
333 See id. at 431.
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causes a $1000 in harm, through loss of creation incentives.  Allowing such a 
product to be on the market is therefore, according to Picker, a bad result.
But there are good responses to Picker’s argument and consequently for a 
lenient market entry rule for new communications technologies. The first is 
institutional.  If the court using the Sony rule gets it wrong and allows 
technological market entry that turns out to be harmful, Congress can later reverse 
the determination.  Indeed had the Sony decision led to the near-collapse of the film 
industry, surely a Congressional remedy would have been forthcoming.   
Conversely, court suppression of a new technology is, for all intents and purposes, 
Congressionally irreversible.  A new technologist almost by definition has little 
change of convincing Congress to reverse a copyright holding.  
Second, Picker’s view may put too much faith in the courts to act as accurate
gatekeepers of market entry.  It is certainly beyond the ability of a court, or indeed 
anyone, to accurately predict the future social benefit of a new technology—such 
are the teachings of evolutionary innovation theory.334  To compare the future 
benefit to the present and future harm introduces still greater chances for error.
For one thing judges might, like other government actors, consistently overrate 
present and visible harms.335 Picker does acknowledge that the assessment of 
benefit should include the possibility that the technology will turn out to be much 
more socially beneficially than originally imagined.  However, he does not develop 
the point further.336
Innovation theory teaches that since technological prediction is difficult, it is 
important, if possible, to let the market assess the potential of any new technology, 
whether a mousetrap, molecule, or copying device.  Government should, this 
suggests, ban a new technology only if the harm of allowing the technology reach 
the market very clearly outweigh the benefits.   These are not controversial 
sentiments outside of the copyright debate.   Government only very rarely reaches 
334 See supra Section II.B.
335 Cf. Anne Krueger, Asymmetries in Policy Between Exportables and Import-Competing Goods, 
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (R. Jones and A. Krueger eds. 1990) 
(discussing “identity bias,” or the tendancy of government actors to act to protect the 




out to ban technological developments that might be harmful, even those that 
distress people like genetic engineering.   In copyright, the equivalent policy is the 
lenient version of the Sony rule.  It asks judges to filter clearly illegimate 
technological uses—those that could not survive but for the advantage of piracy.  It 
leaves the  rest  to the market and Congress if the court is terribly wrong.  This 
formulation of the Sony rule might occasionally lead to dramatic results, but 
creative destruction is not a dinner party.
Whether Sony is too lenient or too strict a rule of market entry is remains an
open question.337 But the case’s institutional significance for copyright’s 
communications policy cannot be doubted.  Sony set the precedent for settling 
technological rivalry problems with the judicially-balanced immunity rules.  It is 
the foundation and centerpiece of copyright’s new communications policy.
C.  Beyond Sony
From Sony, courts have contined to use various judicial immunities, particularly 
fair use, to manage anti-competitive behavior.  While the subject is too broad to 
capture entirely greater awareness of the competitive consequences of their 
decisions for competition among rival disseminators helps illuminate other 
doctrines.
1. Reverse-Engineering.   
Courts have addressed questions of competition among rivals when forced to 
determine whether reverse-engineering of copyrighted computer software should 
be legal. 338  In a typical scenario, a dominant market player owns a given 
“platform” protected by copyright, which amounts to a legally protected link 
between it and its customers.   The competitors of the platform owners seek to 
reach the same customers, and use reverse-engineering to achieve interoperability.    
337 For another view of what the Sony rule should be, see Glenn Lunney Jr., Fair Use and 
Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 975, 977 (2002).
338 See, e.g., Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 
2000) (considering fair use the reverse-engineering of game console for the purposes of creating 
virtual computer console); Sega Enterprises Ltd. V. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(finding that reverse-engineering of software for the purposes of interoperability constitutes fair 
use).
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The resulting problem is a precise replica of the “bottleneck” problem discussed 
above.
Such a bottleneck problem was presented in the seminal case Sega v. Accolade.339
Sega owned the link to the customer: the Genesis game console system.   Accolade 
sought to deliver its own content to Sega’s customers, namely computer games like 
“Hardball” and “Mike Dikta Power Football.”340   The question for the Ninth 
Circuit was something the FCC would have found very familiar:  does Accolade 
get to use Sega’s protected link to deliver its own content?
The rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit is perhaps the broadest endorsement of 
an open competition policy theory seen in post-1976 copyright.   Under the fair-use 
doctrine, Judge Rheinhardt held that competitors were free to make copies in the
course of reverse engineering “solely in order to discover the functional 
requirements for compatibility with the Genesis console--aspects of Sega's 
programs that are not protected by copyright.”341
While the Sega rule, which is widely followed,342 is usually justified as the 
“extraction” of unprotected information, the decision could easily have gone either 
way.   Fair use analysis usually turns on how “commercial” the use is, and there is 
no question that Accolade wanted to make money and, at least in Sega’s judgment, 
was endangering Sega’s profits.      
The Sega rule therefore makes sense if understood as a prophylactic rule 
preventing market lockout by dominant market players.   In communications law 
terms, it goes further than rate-setting (a liability scheme).  It instead declares 
Sega’s and other platforms a commons.   There is an active debate over whether 
“open” or “closed” platforms make better sense for the owner of the platform. 343
But the Sega rule does not trust platform owners to make this decision, echoing the 
339 See Sega, 977 F.2d 1510.
340 Id. at 1516.
341 Id. at 1522.
342 See, e.g., Assessment Technologies of WI v. WIREData, 350 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2003); 
DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Bateman v. 
Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 
1050, 1056-57 (D. Colo 1995), aff'd on other grounds, 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
343 See, e.g., Lemley & Lessig, supra note 273 at 939-40.
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distrust of incumbents common to the open model of communications policy.  The 
Sega rule and its follow-ons are examples of decisions having almost nothing to do 
with authorship policy and everything to do with copyright’s policy as between 
communications rivals. 
2. Contracts - Copyright.  
In many markets, particularly computer software, it is commonplace to use 
contractual provisions to override copyright doctrines like the first-sale doctrine or 
certain aspects of fair-use rights.  Courts have given the enforcement of such 
agreements a mixed reception,344 while academics usually have been more overtly 
hostile.345   But what remains underrecognized is the degree to which contractual 
overrides of copyright rules relate to conditions of competition among rivals.
Academic critics of contractual supplements to copyright bring two lines of 
criticism.  The first comes from contract policy, asserting that the form of the 
contracts (usually shrinkwraps) are at best contracts of adhesion, or not contracts at 
all.346  The second criticism, of more significant interest here, however, comes from 
344 Compare Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F. 2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(stating that “limited use license agreement” printed on package containing computer software 
did not become part of sales agreement for software where it was not assented to at time the 
goods were sold); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that 
shrink-wrap license provisions requiring arbitration do not become part of agreement merely 
by retaining or using product after notice of terms), with ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F3d 1447 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (holding that shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable) and i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout 
Service Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337-39 (D. Mass. 2002) (same).
345 See, e.g., Peggy Radin, “The Evolution of Property and Contract in the Digital 
Environment” (January 2001), available at 
http://www.innovationlaw.org/lawforum/pages/lectureseries.htm; see also Terry Fisher, 
Property And Contract On The Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203 (1998).
346 See, e.g., David A. Einhorn, Box-Top Licenses and the Battle-of-the-Forms, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 
401 (1992) (arguing that shrinkwrap licenses unlikely to be enforced under contract law); David 
L. Hayes, Shrinkwrap License Agreements: New Light on a Vexing Problem, 9 Computer L. 1 
(1992) (contending that shrinkwrap licenses unlikely to be enforced under § 2-207); Thomas 
Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal Nature of Computer Software 
Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577 (1994) (suggesting that shrinkwraps are attempt to return to 
feudal controls on the alienability of property); Michael Schwarz, Tear-Me-Open Software License 
Agreements: A Uniform Commercial Code Perspective on an Innovative Contract of Adhesion, 7 
COMPUTER L.J. 261 (1986) (conspicuously placed shrinkwrap licenses should be enforced).
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copyright policy.  It is the argument that contracts on copyrighted goods distort the 
optimal balance between public access and private incentives that the rules of 
copyright are meant to embody.347
The problem with the policy criticism is that it is too general for courts to 
know when not to enforce contracts that override copyright rules.   It relies on the 
presumption that copyright’s rules are all mandatory and none mere defaults.  
That assumes that the law has guessed the right rules to govern the relationship 
between owner and buyer across the many different markets where copyright 
matters, a supposition that seems unlikely, at best.   The mandatory view neglects 
the value of contractually-modified copyrights for specific markets:  a mixture of 
rights better-tailored to fit market preferences than the rules of copyright would 
grant.348
Courts would benefit from thinking of the copyright-contract problem as 
the problem of blocking market entry.   Where contracts are being used to prevent 
the entry of potential rivals, the concern for modification of copyright’s default 
rules is warranted.  Conversely, when such is not the case, it is easier to presume 
that (as contract policy suggests) the modified set of rights that  emerged are a 
better fit than copyright’s default choices.   To see what this might mean in 
practice, consider the contrasting examples of contractual protection of facts and 
the first sale-doctrine.
The use of contractual provisions to block potential rivals represents the victory 
of contract over the first-sale doctrine.349 The first-sale doctrine prevents the 
copyright owner from destroying or controlling the after-market for its product.   
The contractual override can be used as a means to destroy rivals, suggesting a 
separate and important rationale not to enforce such a restraint.   It is, for example, 
347 See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 
1248-56, 1283-91 (1995); see also, Pamela Samuelson, Symposium: Intellectual Property and Contract 
Law in the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of 
Transactions in Information and Electronic Commerce, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 809 (1998) 
(discussing the relationship between contract and intellectual property).
348 See Glen Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004).
349 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
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probably a failing of copyright policy that there is no apparent market for used 
software.350   Software is very expensive, and as it becomes more mature, one 
would expect, just as in other markets, some people to opt for a used or older 
version of the product that is cheaper.   People, after all, buy used computers and 
other hardware even though such products are obviously not cutting edge.
Today, major software copyright license contains various kinds of 
provisions that effectively forbid resale.351   The effect is to expose potential 
resellers of used copyrighted software to liability, which is why used book stores 
don’t sell used software.   There seems little, from a communications or 
competition policy perspective, to justify this result.
Conversely, copyright doctrine specifies that facts, even those laboriously 
created, are not entitled to copyright protection.352  But should that preclude the 
protection of facts by any legal device?  Contract, of course, creates rather a 
different form of protection for facts—enforceable only as between parties.  Hence 
there is a stronger argument for allowing protection for facts so as create a market 
for a product that might not otherwise exist is convincing.    This is perhaps what 
motivated the Seventh Circuit’s controversial decision in ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg,353 which upheld contractual protection of facts against a claim of 
copyright preemption.  While the language of ProCD broadly suggests that 
copyright will generally yield to contract, the decision is strongest when limited to 
its facts (the protection of facts).
3. The War over Online Distribution
350 See Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and 
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249, 290 (2003).
351 For example, the Microsoft Windows XP End-User License Agreement bans sale of the 
software independent of the computer it comes with:
You may permanently transfer all of your rights under this EULA only as part of a 
permanent sale or transfer of the COMPUTER, provided you retain no copies, if you transfer 
the SOFTWARE (including all component parts, the media, any upgrades, this EULA and the 
Certificate of Authenticity), and the recipient agrees to the terms of this EULA.  
352 See Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340,  344 (1991).
353  86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.1996).
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In the 2000s, it is difficult to pick up a newspaper or magazine without 
seeing something about “digital piracy” and an ongoing “war” between the 
entertainment industry (Los Angeles) and computer programmers (San Francisco).  
There is, I agree, a certain political significance to the efforts of programmers to 
write programs tailored to copyright’s enforcement weaknesses.354  But some of the 
excitement and rhetoric have masked the basic questions of communications policy 
presented.
What is termed the California civil war in fact follows the familiar pattern of 
conflict between challenger and incumbent dissemination industries.   The 
incumbent, the existing recording industry, relies on “fixed” distribution:
distribution of content fixed in CDs, DVDs, or books, sold in retail stores.   The 
challenger relies on online distribution:  that is, direct, Internet-based delivery of 
content in digital form.  No mode of dissemination, from first principles, has the 
obvious upper hand.  Online distribution does eliminate much overhead costs (e.g., 
retail stores) and should be cheaper; it also provides customers the ability to get 
copyrighted content without actually going to a store.  But fixed media has the 
advantage of the fixed form, packaging, and in some cases a superior product (real 
books are beautiful, very portable, and operate without batteries).   Were neutral 
conditions of competition to apply, it might be a fair fight.  But fair fights have 
never been a feature of the history of new communications technologies.   We must 
look to see how copyright sets the stage for competition between the incumbent 
and challenger.
Like their predecessors, certain online distributors have taken advantage of 
copyright “piracy” to gain an advantage over the incumbent.  This was a 
particularly salient issue with respect to music, and the ability to appropriate 
copyrighted material was behind the growth of well-known companies like 
Napster and KaZaA.   To repeat a point made earlier, the structure of the 1976 Act 
makes trying to rely on the ambiguity of the copyright statute (like the recording 
industry in 1909 or Cable in the 1950s) a dicey proposition.355 Instead, the limited 
354See Wu, supra note 66, at 680.
355 Early companies that tried to do so lost nearly immediately.  My MP3.com was an early 
online distributor who tried to “go legit” by licensing music and allowing people to download 
music that they already owned on CD.   It was, however, quickly shut down despite their 
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history and cost of end-user enforcement was the vulnerability exploited by 
programmers. 356 It is important to understand that the pure “Peer-to-peer” 
filesharing programs are not always and necessarily the best systems of online 
distribution.  Their popularity and comparative advantage lies in the fact that they 
are designed to evade copyright’s enforcement system, and therefore minimize the 
price of an essential input (copyrighted materials).
357
Meanwhile, the incumbent recording industry, like some of its predecessors, 
has done just about everything possible to gain control over the challenger.   The 
extent of their efforts has been detailed elsewhere: it includes entirely new 
strategies of enforcement, such the dramatic targeting of end-users,358 investments 
in extra-legal remedies359 and demands that the Justice Department use criminal 
sanctions.360 The recording industry and film industry, like other incumbents have 
not shown an interest in destroying online distribution.   It is a question of control:  
the industry would prefer to steward the arrival of online distribution technology, 
so that it arrives on their schedule and creates collectible revenue.361
While the basic question of online distribution is a mainly a question of 
communications policy, the rhetoric of authorship is nonetheless pervasive.  Early 
on, Metallica Drummer Lars Ulrich, not known for his meekness, said he found 
Napster “sickening,” for Napster, is his view, constituted “stealing” and was 
protestations of fair use.   See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000).
356 See Wu, supra note 66, at 711-716 (describing copyright’s gatekeeper system).
357 See id. at 731-737 (describing the evolution of programs around the problem of copyright 
liability).
358 See, e.g., Recording Industry Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 
F.3d 1229, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (involving recording industry attempt to use subpoenas to 
“unmask” alleged copyright infringers)
359 The RIAA, for example, has used pop up windows to alert those potentially guilty of 
infringement that they are infringing.  See Declan McCullah, Watchdogs rap RIAA’s file-trade 
assault, News.com.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-956176.html (April 30, 2002).
360 See Rick Boucher, Justice Department as antipiracy shill, Cnet News.com, at 
http://news.com.com/2010-1028-5099583.html (October 30, 2003)
361 See, e.g., Remarks of Preston Padden, Executive Vice-President, Disney, Silicon Flatirons 
Telecommunications Conference Feb. 9 2003 (detailing film industry’s plans to introduce online 
distribution).
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“morally and legally wrong.”362 On the other side, artists like Public Enemy’s
Chuck D speak of the benefits of online distribution as an authorship issue.  In 
2000, in Napster’s glory days, D wrote in the New York Times that artists “should 
think of it as a new kind of radio -- a promotional tool that can help artists who 
don't have the opportunity to get their music played on mainstream radio or on 
MTV. … The Internet has created a new planet for musicians to explore, and I'm 
with that.”
363
What can the communications policy perspective tell us?   On the one hand,
the recording industry’s efforts to control online distribution are a classic example 
of the vertical foreclosure discussed in Part II.   Online distribution is a rival 
technology to the recording industry’s existing distribution of compact disks.  The 
industry would like to use their control over copyright, an essential input, so as to 
control how and when online distribution reaches consumers. From this 
perspective the copyright lawsuits are suspect as barrier to free technological 
competition.  But that isn’t the end of the analysis, because unlike other historical 
technological challengers, it is not at all clear that entities like Napster, Aimster or 
KaZaA represent legitimate market entrants.   The complicated part is that peer-to-
peer filesharing networks and online music distribution are not the same thing:  
P2P networks are a particularly “harmful” form of online distribution, at least as 
measured by the potential loss of revenue to creators.
The communications policy perspective, in other words, sees the online 
distribution as a weighing of two costs, both difficult to assess.  On one side is the 
cost of the foreclosure, which are the forgone benefits of the new technology, and 
the benefits of disrupting the market power of existing content industries.   On the 
other side are the lost incentives for new authors and value (if any) of the reliance 
interests in the property rights guaranteed the copyright law.   Weighing these two 
costs leads to a spectrum of plausible policy positions on the question of online 
content distribution, each of which reflects different views of national 
communications policy.   We can group them into three basic positions (reflecting 
the policies described in Part II): radically open, stewarded, and balanced.  
362 Metallica Press Release, April 13, 2000. 
363 Chuck D, “‘Free' Music Can Free the Artist,” N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 2000.
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The radically open position is highly optimistic about the market and the 
process of creative destruction. A strong proponent of an open communications 
policy would give online distribution systems an exemption from contributory 
copyright liability despite the fact that they can be demonstrated to harm or even 
destroy authorial incentives.   The article of faith is that such action, however 
traumatic in the short term for both disseminators and creators, will not destroy
authorial incentives in the long term.   If that’s right, consumer welfare will be 
served both in the short-term (free content) and also the long-term (cheaper 
content).   But how might authorial incentives be restored?  There are two possible 
accounts.  First, there is faith that the demands of the market will necessarily 
recreate authorial incentives from somewhere, even if where is hard to specify right 
now.  If an online distributor like KaZaA becomes a powerful distributor of music, 
it will have a natural need to see its content creators survive, and therefore create 
some mechanism for paying authors.   An alternative view places faith in the 
political process.  Exempting the P2P companies from copyright liability could
force some matters into copyright’s classic communications regimes, forcing a
settlement that will liberate online music distribution.
364
The strongest historical precedent for the radical view is the Supreme 
Court’s 1968 Fortnightly and 1974 Teleprompter decisions.
365 Those decisions were a 
leap of faith.  They projected that even though cable companies at the time did 
nothing but free-ride on broadcast, cable would nonetheless one day take on 
serious responsibilities rather than run television into the ground.  In the current 
conext, the closest legal endorsement of this viewpoint comes from Judge Stephen 
Wilson, district judge in the Grokster litigation,
366 the the recording industry’s 
lawsuit against KaZaA and similar programs.   Judge Wilson, granted Grokster 
summary judgment against the copyright claims against it, did so stating that “In a 
case like this, in which Congress has not plainly marked our course, we must be 
364 As contemplated in Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose A Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow 
Free Peer-To-Peer File Sharing, 17 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 1 (2003), and William Fisher, A Royalties Plan 
for File Sharing, CNET News, July 11, 2003. 
365 Discussed in Part I.G(3) , supra.
366 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F.Supp.2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 
2003).
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circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative enactment 
which never calculated such a calculus of interests.”
367  Wilson’s stated view of 
copyright that does not automatically apply in new settings is a lenient view of 
Sony and a policy of open market entry.
The diametric opposite to the radical open position is the stewardship 
position.  The open position’s alleged faith in the political process and free market 
does not impress proponents of a Steward-based communications policy.   In their 
view, copyright is property, and property a market precondition.  To argue that the 
state should allow an exemption to the enforcement property rights to promote the 
functioning of market is therefore is a logical contradiction.  The Steward view at 
its strongest also believes that the incumbent industry can and should be trusted to 
introduce online dissemination in an efficient and timely manner.
368
The third view is the Sony position adhered to by the Ninth
369 and Seventh 
Circuits
370—a middle road between the open and stewarded views. Unlike the 
stewarded view, it sees incumbent-control of a new technology as undesirable, yet 
is sensitive, unlike the radically open view, to the destruction of creative incentives.   
Hence it asks the judiciary to judge whether a pirate industry is likely to become a 
legitimate market market player.   The effect is to call for the greatest judicial 
involvement and oversight of the three views described here.   The radically open 
view would abandon the future of content distribution to market forces or 
Congress, while the stewarded view places the incumbent in a position to decide 
when and how online distribution will arrive.  But the intermediate position in 
Napster and Aimster puts the federal judiciary in a position of continuing 
supervision of the online distribution industry, waiting for the moment that the 
pirate becomes legitimate.
The clearest example of this approach is Judge Richard Posner’s Aimster 
decision, which is unusually candid about the competitive consequences of the 
case.   The decision opens with a rejection of the stewardship model as contrary to 
367 Id. at 1046.
368 As discussion in Section II.B(2), supra.
369 A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
370 In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Sony:  the recording industry had argued that actual knowledge of any
infringement was sufficient to find liability.  Posner rejects that position, saying it 
“could result in the shutting down of the [distribution] service or its annexation by 
the copyright owners (contrary to the clear import of the Sony decision).”371 But 
Judge Posner is also unwilling to grant open-ended market entry to Aimster and 
similar online distribution systems.   Aimster’s lawyers press for an interpretation 
that would essentially mimic the results of Teleprompter:  a holding that even 
potential of legimate uses are enough to create an exemption from copyright.   This 
view is also rejected:  “It is not enough, as we have said, that a product or service 
be physically capable, as it were, of a noninfringing use.” 372
So instead the Seventh Circuit lays out, in detail, what an online content 
distribution system must do to gain market entry.  The result is slightly reminiscent 
of technologically-specific communications regulation.  Judge Posner gives five 
examples of non-infringing uses that if in substantial evidence would make it a 
legitimate market entrant under the Sony rule.   His examples range from the 
obvious to the slightly less so, including the distribution of uncopyrighted music
exchange as well as anonymous sharing of uncopyrighted photographs and dirty 
jokes.
373 The upshot is a decision that both leaves open the door for future market 
entry, and tells businesses where that door is.   This level of guidance and judicial 
assessment of technology in Aimster is the consequence of the system Sony created.
If the Supreme Court should reconsider Sony in the context of online content 
distribution, it will face three policy options described here.   It can make market 
entry substantially easier with a broad exemption for bold new pirate technologies, 
and hope that the market or Congress will take care of the resultant chaos.   It can 
harken back to the Bell System, tighten incumbent control, and trust existing 
players to introduce new technologies in a planned way.   Or it can stick with the 
Sony rule and its consequent involvement of the federal judiciary in the weighing 
of the merit of new technological entrants.  As the descriptions suggest, none of 
these options is particularly tidy.   Yet the history of copyright’s communications 
371 Aimster, 334 F.3d at 648.
372 Id. at 653.
373 See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652-653.
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policy gives us no reason to expect clean solutions to conflicts among rival 
disseminators.   
What the right answer is to the online distribution problem is hard to say.  
But it is incumbent that the Courts be aware that their copyright decision are de 
facto setting a substantial and growing part of the nation’s communications policy.  
The instinct that what matters in copyright is that authors be protected is not 
incorrect but simply an insufficient accounting of the issues presented.  For behind 
authorship concerns lies a cycle of incumbent and challenger technologies that will 
never end.  The only question is how painful and costly the transitions will be.  
CONCLUSION
This article has identified and described a dynamic that at once underlies much 
of copyright law and yet is not considered part of orthodox copyright theory.   That 
dynamic is copyright’s role in the regulation of competing disseminators, and 
particularly new and incumbent industries.
There is generous evidence of the effects of this dynamic in both the history of 
copyright and the law itself.   Some of the strongest examples are the compulsory 
licensing settlements written directly into the copyright law.   But the question of 
copyright’s effects on competition among disseminators is evident in many of the 
important doctrines of copyright.  Concern for the competitive effects of copyright 
underlies the fair use decisions on reverse engineering, some of the copyright-
contract discussions, and other matters.   Today, the dominant example is the Sony 
doctrine, which has been used by courts as a gateway between authorship policy 
and communication policy:  to decide whether a court faces a problem of market 
entry, and whether it needs to do something about it.
Many of these effects are not unknown to copyright theorists.  The principal 
goal of this paper has been to analytically consolidate these scattered doctrines and 
to understand them as a de facto communications policy.  The secondary goal is to 
try and theorize copyright’s effects on competition among disseminators:  to 
understand what choices copyright decisions have, and what values the decisions 
taken are promoting. As copyright law becomes more important, it is essential that 
judges, law-makers and academics understand the effects of the law on parties 
other than authors.
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